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Technology advancements in areas of mobile computing, social networks, and
cloud computing have rapidly changed the way we communicate and interact. The
wide adoption of media-oriented mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets
enables people to capture information in various media formats, and offers them a
rich platform for media consumption. The proliferation of online services and social
networks makes it possible to store personal multimedia collection online and share
them with family and friends anytime anywhere. Considering the increasing impact
of digital multimedia and the trend of cloud computing, this dissertation explores
the problem of how to evaluate trustworthiness and preserve confidentiality of online
multimedia data.
The dissertation consists of two parts. The first part examines the problem
of evaluating trustworthiness of multimedia data distributed online. Given the dig-
ital nature of multimedia data, editing and tampering of the multimedia content
becomes very easy. Therefore, it is important to analyze and reveal the processing
history of a multimedia document in order to evaluate its trustworthiness. We pro-
pose a new forensic technique called “Forensic Hash”, which draws synergy between
two related research areas of image hashing and non-reference multimedia forensics.
A forensic hash is a compact signature capturing important information from the
original multimedia document to assist forensic analysis and reveal processing his-
tory of a multimedia document under question. Our proposed technique is shown to
have the advantage of being compact and offering efficient and accurate analysis to
forensic questions that cannot be easily answered by convention forensic techniques.
The answers that we obtain from the forensic hash provide valuable information on
the trustworthiness of online multimedia data.
The second part of this dissertation addresses the confidentiality issue of mul-
timedia data stored with online services. The emerging cloud computing paradigm
makes it attractive to store private multimedia data online for easy access and shar-
ing. However, the potential of cloud services cannot be fully reached unless the issue
of how to preserve confidentiality of sensitive data stored in the cloud is addressed. In
this dissertation, we explore techniques that enable confidentiality-preserving search
of encrypted multimedia, which can play a critical role in secure online multimedia
services. Techniques from image processing, information retrieval, and cryptogra-
phy are jointly and strategically applied to allow efficient rank-ordered search over
encrypted multimedia database and at the same time preserve data confidentiality
against malicious intruders and service providers. We demonstrate high efficiency
and accuracy of the proposed techniques and provide a quantitative comparative
study with conventional techniques based on heavy-weight cryptography primitives.
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1.1 Trustworthiness and Confidentiality of Online Multimedia
Recent years have witnessed important technology advancements and trends
that have brought stronger momentum and ubiquitousness to online multimedia
data such as digital images and videos. First of all, the flourish of mobile devices,
especially smartphones and portable cameras, brings the media generation capabil-
ity to the general public. With the greatly improved camera quality and increasingly
larger device storage, people can take images/videos anytime anywhere to save im-
portant moments of their lives and record interesting events around them. This
leads to the explosion on the number of online multimedia data, as evidenced by
the online media sharing sites such as YouTube and Flickr.
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Fuelled by the explosion of user-generated multimedia content, media sharing
and consumption becomes an indispensable component of today’s online experience.
Various media sharing sites and social networks, such as YouTube, Flickr, Facebook,
Twitter, offer a convenient platform for multimedia data to reach the widest range
of audience ever possible. In addition to user-generated content, professional news
agencies and media companies are also putting great effort in utilizing the online
media sharing services to help them reach a greater amount of audience in a fast
and effective way. Multimedia is having a far wider social impact than ever before.
The wide availability of mobile devices and media sharing services have helped
diversify the way how multimedia data are consumed. In addition to direct point-to-
point transmission, such as web-based browsing, multimedia can also be transmitted
through peer-to-peer networks and wireless networks such as 3G and 4G networks.
This diversified communication channel along with the digital nature of multimedia
data allows an adversary to easily modify the multimedia content and convey com-
pletely different information to the end user. This brings serious questions on how
to evaluate the trustworthiness of online multimedia data that we look at everyday.
The enabling technology behind various online services is cloud computing,
which aims at providing online services for many kinds of digital data. In such a
setting, the data will be stored online, and all the management and computation
tasks will be performed by the server. Cloud computing has the advantage of reliable
storage and providing easy access anytime anywhere. Given the rapid growth of
personal multimedia collections, storing and managing multimedia data online is an
attractive option. However, online systems are vulnerable to attacks and intrusions.
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Therefore, protecting the confidentiality of sensitive data stored online is a critical
research issue that has to be addressed in order for the cloud computing to reach
its full potential.
1.2 Main Contributions and Dissertation Organization
Motivated by the above mentioned technology trends and the challenges in-
volved therein, we explore two research problems in this dissertation. In the first
problem, we examine the problem of how to evaluate trustworthiness of online mul-
timedia data. We propose and develop new forensic tools to detect and estimate
several important operations that a multimedia document may have undergone. In
contrast to conventional authentication that provides primarily a binary answer
of being trustworthy or not, our proposed techniques can reveal more informa-
tion on the processing history. This capability can help people make better uti-
lization of online multimedia data. The second problem that we explored is on
confidentiality-preserving content-based search of online multimedia. We propose
efficient techniques by combining areas of image processing, information retrieval,
and cryptography. Comparison with conventional cryptography-based approaches
is also provided to justify the good trade-off between efficiency and security offered
by our proposed techniques. The outline of this dissertation is illustrated in Fig. 1.1.
Below, we highlight the key contributions of this dissertation research.
3
Figure 1.1: Dissertation outline
1.2.1 Forensic Hash for Multimedia Information Assurance
We propose a new multimedia forensic framework by utilizing side information
called forensic hash. A forensic hash is a compact signature capturing important
information from the original multimedia data for later forensic analysis. This new
framework draws synergy from two related research areas, namely, image hashing
and no-reference multimedia forensics. The forensic hash is nearly as compact as tra-
ditional image hash but can be used to answer a broader scope of forensic questions
than a simple binary authenticity answer. Compared with no-reference forensics,
the proposed forensic hash offers more efficient and accurate forensic analysis, and
can answer questions that are difficult to answer in a blind scenario.
To avoid the dilemma of one-scheme-fit-all, the forensic hash takes a modular
design such that different modules tackle different forensic questions separately and
at the same time they complement each other and work together synergistically.
This modular design brings the advantage of extensibility to forensic hash.
We proposed two novel constructions of forensic hash and demonstrate that
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they can provide robust and accurate estimation of geometric transform such as
rotation and scaling on modified images. Furthermore, we also demonstrate the
forensic hash’s capability for locating tampering and estimating advanced editing
operations such as seam carving, which is an adaptive image resizing technique.
Finally, we extend the spirit of forensic hash to the task of image quality as-
sessment. By utilizing compact side information, we propose novel techniques for
reduced-reference quality assessment on images that have undergone retargeting,
which is the first endeavor on this problem to the best of our knowledge. The
proposed quality metrics show positive correlation with human subjective ratings;
furthermore, the proposed quality assessment algorithm can provide a detailed dis-
tortion map to assist human observers to make a personalized decision rather than
accepting a single quality score as in conventional image quality assessment work.
1.2.2 Confidentiality-Preserving Search of Online Multimedia
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first endeavor in the community
to explore techniques for confidentiality-preserving content-based search of multi-
media. This problem has unique challenges as compared to many existing secure
computation works, in terms of large volume of multimedia data, requiring rank-
ordered retrieval, demanding efficient computation and minimum user-involvement.
We address this problem from a joint signal processing and cryptography point of
view and propose efficient techniques with good security-efficiency trade-off.
The key techniques proposed in this work is distance-preserving randomiza-
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tion. By strategically utilizing techniques from image processing, information re-
trieval, and cryptography, we propose efficient randomization algorithms with good
distance-preserving property. In addition to randomizing visual features for similar-
ity comparison, we also explore randomization techniques for state-of-the-art search
indexes. Experimental results demonstrate high search accuracy and efficiency of
the proposed techniques.
We also carry out a quantitative study on the amount of randomness and
confidentiality protection offered by our proposed techniques. A comprehensive
comparison with cryptographic approaches based on homomorphic encryption is
carried out, which demonstrates the pros and cons of various alternatives for the
problem of confidentiality-preserving multimedia search. Such a comparative study
provides valuable insight in designing other confidentiality-preserving computation
techniques for various online applications that involve digital multimedia.
1.2.3 Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we pro-
pose the framework of multimedia forensics using forensic hash. The main idea
of the forensic hash and its relation with areas such as image hashing and non-
reference forensics are discussed. We describe in detail the proposed hash construc-
tions, namely, an alignment component for geometric transform estimation and an
integrity component for tampering localization. Experimental results on discrim-
inability, robustness, estimation accuracy of the forensic hash are presented at the
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end of Chapter 2. By extending the capability and spirit of forensic hash, we discuss
in Chapter 3 two applications for retargeted images that have undergone adaptive re-
sizing: one is estimating seam carving operation, and the other is reduced-reference
quality assessment on retargeted images. In Chapter 4, we study the problem of
confidentiality-preserving search of online multimedia. Randomization techniques
for both the visual features and search indexes will be discussed in detail. The
comparative study between the proposed techniques and conventional cryptography
techniques is provided in Chapter 5, which demonstrates the different trade-offs
between security and efficiency of different techniques. Finally in Chapter 6, we
conclude and present some interesting research issues for future exploration.
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CHAPTER 2
Forensic Hash for Multimedia Information Assurance
2.1 Background and Related Work
Recent years have witnessed rapid growth of mobile devices capable of captur-
ing high quality images and videos, and social media networks that provide various
media sharing and streaming services. These new trends have generated a huge
amount of personal multimedia content and significantly increased multimedia con-
sumption over the Internet and on various devices. Photos, videos, and recordings
have long been used in news media as a vivid evidential representation of important
events. However, the digital nature of multimedia data and the advancement of
multimedia processing technologies have made it easy to modify the digital content.
Multimedia data can be intentionally altered to create a forgery and convey a differ-
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ent meaning, so seeing is no longer enough for believing! For example, objects can
be removed from or inserted into an image, and multiple pieces of content may be
combined into a new creation. As such, it is critical to evaluate the trustworthiness
of multimedia information and reveal its complete processing history in order to
achieve better decision and usage of online multimedia information.
There are two traditional techniques to evaluate image trustworthiness and
authenticity, namely, robust image hashing [36, 53, 74, 105, 109] and blind multime-
dia forensics [24]. In the scenario of point-to-point image authentication, the sender
attaches a short signature or hash with the image, and the receiver computes the
hash from the received image and compares it to the attached hash according to
some distance measure. A small distance indicates the received image is authentic,
while a large distance implies the received image is a different image or has under-
gone significant tampering. Such a simple distance comparison using image hashing
answers mainly the binary question of image authenticity, and it is challenging to
achieve a good trade-off between being robust against global operations, locating
local tampering, and keeping the hash length short. On the other hand, existing
research in multimedia forensics mainly tries to determine the origin and detect po-
tential tampering for digitally acquired images/videos without proactive aids such
as hash attachment or embedded watermark [24]. Such forensic techniques typically
explore unique signal traces left on the content by potential processing operations,
but the lack of any side information about the original data makes many tasks
computationally intensive, as exhaustive search in a large parameter space is often
required and the achieved accuracy can be limited. Furthermore, since the intrinsic
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signal traces are publicly accessible and no secret key is involved, these non-intrusive
forensics can be vulnerable to anti-forensic attacks.
Considering these advances and limitations of related techniques, an important
research question is to explore by appending a short string as in the conventional
hashing applications, whether we can use such additional information to augment
the capabilities of both conventional hash and non-intrusive forensics to determine
the processing history that the source data has undergone with improved accuracy
and efficiency. Such capabilities of evaluating the integrity, provenance, and pro-
cessing history can enable us to assess the trustworthiness of multimedia data at a
much more flexible and fine level while avoiding the dilemma of one-size-fits-all de-
signs. We refer to such a new forensic framework as “Forensic Hash for Information
Assurance”, or FASHION in short. Below we first review the related literature in
the area of image hashing and blind multimedia forensics, and then summarize the
main idea and contribution of our work.
Related work on robust image hashing Robust image hashing is an extension
from traditional cryptography hash. A cryptography hash is used to evaluate doc-
ument authenticity and is sensitive to a single bit difference, while the image hash
is designed to be similar across visually similar images that may have undergone
moderate content preserving operations from a same original image but sensitive
against malicious content tampering. The distance between two image hashes is
compared with a threshold to determine whether the received image is authen-
tic. Image hashing algorithms typically involve feature selection, quantization and
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compressive encoding. Some of the features that have been used in the literature
include block intensity averages [120] or histograms [19,32,48], image edge informa-
tion [86], DCT coefficients [58], the scale interaction model with the Mexican-Hat
wavelets [8], Fourier-Mellion features for geometric resilience [105], median points
from the Radon projections [35], geometry preserving local feature points [73], pro-
jections onto smooth random patterns [36], matrix invariants through singular value
decomposition [53], and non-negative matrix factorization [74]. For applications that
require a hash to be difficult to be guessed or forged, randomization is applied to dif-
ferent stages of hash construction, such as feature extraction, quantization, and/or
encoding [36,74,105,109].
Robust image hashing can be used for image authentication, but a simple bi-
nary decision of authenticity is often inadequate. For example, an image that has
undergone a small amount of local edits may be considered as a different image using
existing image hashing, but the rest of the image content may still be trustworthy
and contain valuable information. It is desirable to provide more information about
the processing history of the multimedia data, so that the end users can have the
flexibility in determining whether to trust the image content and how to utilize the
received data for specific applications. Some recent work on robust image hashing
can provide certain forensic capabilities. Roy and Sun [88] incorporate Scale Invari-
ant Feature Transform (SIFT) features [61] into a hash for geometric registration of
the received image with respect to the original and enable more reliable tampering
localization than prior art. Lin et al. [59] apply distributed source coding to encode
information about the original image and employ EM algorithm to estimate poten-
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tial operations on the image. These prior techniques have some limitations: the use
of SIFT feature in [88] results in considerable increase in the hash length and the
image registration is not possible when the selected SIFT points are not available in
the received image; and the EM algorithm used in [59] is computationally intensive
because separate algorithms need to be applied for each specific type of operations
that the image may have undergone.
Related work on multimedia forensics The research objective of multimedia
forensics is to provide tools for analyzing the origin, processing history, and trust-
worthiness of multimedia information. Recent research in multimedia forensics can
determine whether a received image/video has undergone certain operations with-
out access to the original data. This is accomplished by analyzing intrinsic traces
left by devices and processing, and by identifying inconsistencies in signal charac-
teristics [31, 96]. Bayram et al. [6] and Swaminathan et al. [106] tried to identify
the model of the camera by learning color filter array (CFA) interpolation patterns
from images that are taken by the camera [6, 106]. Lukas et al. proposed to use
the camera sensor imperfections as a unique signature to provide linkage between
an image and its capturing device [70]. Popescu and Farid estimate the re-sampling
factor of an image by examining the linear dependencies among image pixels re-
sulted from the re-sampling process [84]. Malicious tampering of the image through
cut-and-paste can also be detected by examining inconsistencies in signal statistics.
Farid [30] performs image tampering localization by exploiting the inconsistencies
of JPEG quality, as operations such as cut and paste often leave areas with different
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JPEG quality factors in the same image. Another useful type of inconsistency is
the directions of lighting and shadow. Johnson et al. evaluate the trustworthiness
of an image by estimating the lighting direction in different parts of the image [49]
. An authentic image has consistent lighting direction, while the cut-and-paste op-
erations usually bring to the image some new content that has different lighting
configuration. The above mentioned blind forensic work provide valuable tools to
evaluate multimedia trustworthiness, but they have limitations in terms of the accu-
racy levels and the scope of forensic questions that can be answered. Such operations
as cropping and rotation can be difficult to estimate without any side information
about the original image. Many signal statistics and traces left by image operations
may be removed or altered by further post-processing. A considerable amount of
computational complexity is also involved in most blind forensic analyses.
Main idea and contribution of our work Given that the conventional image
hashing only provides a binary authentication answer using simple distance com-
parison, and the blind forensics techniques have limitations in terms of the scope
of questions that can be answered and the computational complexity, we propose
the FASHION framework [65,67,68] to bridge these two research areas and combine
their benefits. The FASHION framework uses side information called forensic hash
to assist forensic analysis, and its relation with the other two research areas is shown
in Fig. 2.1.
A forensic hash is designed to be nearly as compact as a conventional image
hash, but instead of providing a binary decision, the generation and utilization of
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Figure 2.1: Forensic hash as compared to image hashing and blind forensics
forensic hash are designed to reveal more information about the processing history in
terms of the likely types and the associated parameters of the processing operations.
Compared to blind forensics, forensic hash has the advantage of being able to answer
a broader scope of questions in a more accurate and efficient way.
The main contributions of our work include: a new framework of multime-
dia forensics by using side information represented via a compact hash; a modular
design of forensic hash to address different forensic questions in a flexible and exten-
sible way while avoiding the one-scheme-fits-all dilemma; two novel constructions of
forensic hash that provide robust estimation of geometric transform such as rotation
and scaling. The proposed forensic hash also achieves higher image discrimination
capability than representative prior art.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 explains the overall
framework of multimedia forensics analysis using forensic hash. In Section 2.3, we
present two constructions of forensic hash, based on Radon transform, scale space
theory and visual words representation of SIFT features, respectively. In Section 2.4,
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we discuss the tampering localization capability of the forensic hash construction.
The experimental results including image discrimination, geometric transform esti-
mation, and tampering localization are presented in Section 2.5. Summary of the
chapter is given in Section 2.6.
2.2 FASHION Framework
The objective of the proposed FASHION framework is to achieve efficient
and accurate multimedia forensics by properly designing forensic hashes to capture
important side information from the original image. We illustrate the role of forensic











Figure 2.2: Flowchart of media
processing
Figure 2.3: Modular design of forensic
hash to reveal image processing history
After an image is captured by an imaging device, it may undergo certain
preprocessing operations inside the device, such as white balance adjustment and
color correction. The image will then be available in digital format for distribution
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and consumption. In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of a future received
image and reveal potential operations during the distribution, a forensic hash can
be generated at a point before the transmission. When the image is being distributed
through different types of networks, such as P2P networks and mobile networks, to
various receiving devices, some adaptations to the image format and content may
occur. For example, the image may be resized and cropped for different screen sizes;
logos may be inserted to image corners. In addition to these necessary adaptations,
there can be malicious tampering that alters the image content to convey a different
semantic meaning. The role of forensic hash is to be securely attached along with
the transmitted image and assist the forensic analysis on the received image.
In order to better evaluate the trustworthiness of a received image, it is bene-
ficial and sometimes necessary to gain more knowledge about the processing history
of the data. For example, estimating the geometric transform that an image may
undergone, such as rotation angle and scaling factor, is extremely helpful to align
the received image with the original image so that further localization of the tam-
pering can be easily performed. In traditional image hashing, the design goal is to
extract features that are robust to allowable image operations. In many cases, it is
difficult to find a feature that is robust to a wide range of operations while still be
highly discriminative. For forensic hash, the goal is to detect the presence of image
operations and estimate the associated parameters if possible. In order to avoid the
problem of one-scheme-fits-all as in many prior image hashing work, a modular and
multi-resolution design is desirable. Such a design includes several modules each fo-
cusing on some class of forensic tasks at various resolutions, while at the same time
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complementing each other and working synergistically. For example, an alignment
component can be used to estimate geometric transform and provide a global view
of an image to tell whether it is the same image modified from the original image
or a completely different image. An integrity component then acts upon the global
view to provide a finer resolution analysis on image integrity through localized ap-
proaches. Such a modular and integrated structure also enables easier design of
other forensic modules to extend forensic capabilities in the future.
Unlike traditional image hashing, forensic hashes from similar images do not
have to be similar in terms of smaller distance between the two hashes. Instead, effi-
cient algorithms are designed to analyze both the forensic hash and the received im-
age to identify potential operations that the image may have undergone and estimate
the parameters of such operations. Desirable properties for forensic hash include ro-
bustness, scalability, and distinctiveness. Robustness means that the forensic hash
can provide accurate analysis for images that have undergone multiple operations
and strong tampering; scalability ensures that the performance of forensic analysis
can be improved as we include more side information; distinctiveness implies that
it is difficult to find two different images that give similar forensic hashes. The
forensic hash is designed to be as compact as possible and enable forensic analysis
with low complexity, which makes it possible to be used in band-limited channels
and on small devices such as mobile phones.
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2.3 Hash Construction for Geometric Alignment
The FASHION framework that we described in previous section is modular
in nature. The forensic hash of an image can contain various forensic components
designed for different forensic tasks at different resolutions and work together in a
synergistic way. The modular design of forensic hash provides flexibility to suit for
different applications. In this section, we first present the proposed algorithms for
the alignment component of forensic hash, whose role is to estimate geometric trans-
forms, such as rotation and scaling, and align the modified image with the original
image to allow further forensic analysis. We then briefly present the constructions
and usage of an integrity check component for cropping estimation and tampering
localization.
2.3.1 Alignment based on Radon Transform and Scale-Space Theory
Geometric transforms such as rotation and scaling are common post-processing
operations and the estimation of such transform parameters are important in order
to compare the original and modified images on a common ground. Prior work [59,
88] on image hashing either result in considerable hash length to incorporate the
geometric registration information or require high computational cost to estimate
the transform parameters. In this subsection, we propose two constructions for
the alignment component. The first construction is based on Radon transform and
scale space theory, while the second one builds on robust SIFT features. The two
constructions offer different trade-offs between robustness and compactness, which
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will be discussed below in more detail.
To align a received image with its original version, we exploit Radon transform
for its nice property of separating scaling and rotation. Radon transform is a line
integral of an image along certain directions and is a useful tool for image registra-
tion [115] and authentication [35]. Such line integral captures salient information
about the image alone particular directions, and is robust to small variations in the
image content, which may come from noise, moderate cropping, local tampering,
and content preserving operations such as filtering, brightness/contrast adjustment.
We use a compact summarization along the angular axis in the transform domain
for rotation estimation and employ scale space theory to identify scale-resilient fea-
tures along projections at different directions for scaling estimation. The overall
block diagram for the alignment component construction is shown in Fig. 2.4, and
we discuss the details next.
Figure 2.4: Block diagram for the alignment component based on Radon transform
and scale space theory (Round corner boxes constitute the alignment component)
Rotation Estimation The direction of image edges can reveal information about
image orientation. For an original image I(x, y), we first compute its edge map
E(x.y) using Canny edge detector [17]. Radon transform is then applied on the
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edge map E(x, y). Radon transform of an image is essentially a line integral of that




E(ρ cos θ − u sin θ, ρ sin θ + u cos θ)du. (2.1)
Given image I ′ which is obtained from I by rotating α degrees counter-
clockwise, its edge map E ′ would give a Radon transform RE′(ρ, θ) = RE(ρ, θ + α).
Thus, in the transform domain, rotation becomes a shift along the angular axis. To
estimate the rotation angle, we extract a 1-D summarization of the Radon trans-
form along the angle axis. For Radon transforms RE(ρ, θ) and RE′(ρ, θ), the 1-D
summarization is derived as m(θ) = maxρ(RE(ρ, θ)), and m
′(θ) = maxρ(RE′(ρ, θ)).
For compact representation, quantization and subsampling are applied to m(θ).
Since downsampling may cause aliasing, we first pass the signal m(θ) through a
low-pass filter flow(·) to obtain m̂(θ) = flow(m(θ)). If an n-byte alignment com-
ponent is desired, we downsample the signal m̂(θ) to obtain the forensic hash
h = {h(1), · · · , h(n)} with h(i) = m̂(b(i− 1) · 180
n
c), i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
When estimating the geometric transform for image I ′, the Radon transform
of its edge map RE′(ρ, θ) and the 1-D summarization m
′(θ) = maxρ(RE′(ρ, θ)) are
generated accordingly. In order to compare with the alignment component h in the
forensic hash of the original image, m′(θ) will be passed through a low-pass filter
and downsampled at different shift positions to obtain h′(φ) = {h′(1), · · · , h′(n)}
with h′(i) = m̂′(b(i − 1) · 180
n
c + φ), φ = 0, 1, · · · , 179. The shift amount that
maximizes the cross-correlation between h and h′(φ) is considered as the rotation
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angle between the two images I and I ′, i.e.




h(i)h′(i+ φ), φ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 179}. (2.2)
To further compress the forensic hash, we apply ordinal ranking to h and
store only the rank order information, i.e. rank(h) = {r(1), · · · , r(n)} where r(i) ∈
{1, · · · , n} is the rank of h(i). Given h′(φ) of I ′, its rank order information is
denoted by rank(h′(φ)) = {r′(1), · · · , r′(n)}. The shift amount that minimizes the
L1 distance between rank(h) and rank(h
′(φ)) will be the estimated rotation angle
between the two images I and I ′, i.e.




|r(i)− r′(i+ φ)|, φ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 179}. (2.3)
Experimental results in Section 2.5.3 show that rotation estimation using
rank order information gives performance comparable to estimation using cross-
correlation, and a proper fusion of the two similarity metrics in (2) and (3) can lead
to further improved estimation accuracy.
Scaling Estimation Given the original image I and its scaled version I ′ with
scaling factor s, their Radon transforms have the property that the Radon projec-
tions at any particular angle θ, fθ(ρ) = RI(ρ, θ) and f
′
θ(ρ) = RI′(ρ, θ), have the
same scaling factor s, i.e. fθ(ρ) = s · f ′θ(s · ρ). However, this ideal scaling relation
may not be exactly satisfied when the image has undergone additional cropping,
local tampering, and other image processing operations such as filtering and con-
trast enhancement. It is necessary to investigate a robust representation of Radon
projections that is resilient to these operations.
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We propose to use scale space features of the 1-D signals fθ(ρ) and f
′
θ(ρ) to
address this problem. Scale space theory [60] is a powerful tool for analyzing signals
at different scales, making it useful for automatic scale selection and scale invariant
image analysis. Given fθ(ρ) of the original image at a particular θ, we generate its
scale space representation L(ρ; t) by convolving fθ(ρ) with a 1-D discrete Gaussian
filter g(ρ; t) at scale t:





The scale space representation is a 2-dimensional signal with higher value of t indi-
cating coarser scale.
With L(ρ; t) computed, we then locate the extrema of L(ρ; t) at each scale t by
detecting the zero-crossing positions of ∂L(ρ; t)/∂t for each t. For the Lena image
shown in Fig. 2.6, its Radon projection R(ρ, θ) along the vertical direction f0(ρ) is
shown in Fig. 2.7. The local extrema across scales in the scale-space representation
of f0(ρ) are illustrated in Fig. 2.5, where horizontal direction represents the signal
and the vertical direction represents the scale. Extrema positions are marked black,
and the scale becomes coarser from top to bottom . Smoothing using Gaussian
kernel has the property that no new extrema will be created in coarser scales [60],
which means that the number of extrema will be fewer in the coarser scale and their
evolution over scales will never cross each other.
We can see from Fig. 2.5 that smoothing can cause the extrema to drift at
coarse scales. In order to locate each extremum accurately, we trace the extrema
from the coarse scale to the finest scale and use its position at the finest scale.
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Figure 2.5: Space extrema across scales: horizontal direction represents the signal
and the vertical direction represents the scale, with fine scale at the top and coarse
scale at the bottom.
During tracing, we also compute the lifetime of a space extremum and denote it
as log(tD), where tD is the scale at which the extrema disappears. Since the scale
used in the Gaussian kernel is exponentially sampled, using logarithm ensures that
signals at different scales are treated in a similar way [60]. Extrema with longer
lifetime are expected to capture more important information about the signal and
are more robust against local variations of the signal. The ten extrema of f0(ρ) with
longest lifetime are shown in Fig. 2.7, which captures the most stable extrema while
omitting small variations in the signal.
After computing fθ(ρ) from the original image, the alignment component is
augmented for scaling estimation by recording the positions of the n extrema of
fθ(ρ) that have the longest lifetime across scales, where n can be determined by
the desired hash length. Since the extrema with long lifetime are expected to be
stable after scaling even with cropping and local tampering, we use their positions
to estimate the scaling factor s through the RANSAC algorithm [34]. Given the
extrema positions of the two signals fθ(ρ) and f
′
θ(ρ) = s·fθ(s·ρ), we randomly choose
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Figure 2.6: Lena image

















Figure 2.7: The 10 most stable extrema of
f0(ρ) are shown in star. f0(ρ) is the Radon
projection of the edge map of image Lena
along the vertical direction.
two extrema x, y from fθ(ρ) and two extrema x
′, y′ from f ′θ(ρ) in each iteration of
the RANSAC algorithm. An estimate ŝ of the true scaling factor s is given by the
ratio of |x′ − y′|/|x − y|. We then scale the signal f ′θ(ρ) based on ŝ and align it to
the original extrema from fθ(ρ) to count the number of matched extrema between
the scaled f ′θ(ρ) and fθ(ρ). After a given number of iterations or when the number
of matched extrema exceeds certain threshold, the scaling factor that gives the
maximum number of matched extrema between fθ(ρ) and the scaled f
′
θ(ρ) will be
the estimated scaling factor s∗. By computing the Radon projections of the original
image along both the vertical and horizontal directions, i.e., θ = 0 and 90, we can
obtain the scaling factors along these two directions using the above method. In
Section 2.5, we report the experimental result which shows good performance of
geometric transform estimation using the proposed alignment component.
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2.3.2 Alignment based on Visual Words Representation of SIFT
Despite the good robustness and compactness, the alignment component based
on Radon transform has some limitations. First, representing a two-dimensional im-
age by a one-dimensional Radon projection may lose discriminative information of
the image. Second, a large amount of cropping and local tampering may affect the
Radon projections along all directions and make the geometric transform estima-
tion less accurate. To overcome these limitations, we propose a second construction
of the alignment component based on salient local features and their visual words
representation. The basic idea is to extract more localized features across the im-
age, and such features capture geometric information about the image and remain
robust against common image processing and tampering operations. Using local
features to complement global features such as Radon projection can improve the
robustness of geometric transform estimation against larger amount of cropping and
local tampering. The key challenge is to select proper local features and develop
their compact representation. In this section, we propose a novel algorithm that
uses robust SIFT points [61] as local features while encoding their high dimensional
descriptors into a compact visual words representation for forensic analysis.
Visual words for FASHION The visual words representation for multimedia
documents was proposed by Nistér and Stewénius [76] for efficient object recognition
and retrieval over large databases. As shown in Fig. 2.8, to generate the visual words
representation, visual features are first extracted from the image or video to describe
its local appearance. Visual features can be color histograms, shape descriptors,
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and invariant region descriptors such as SIFT. Each of the feature vectors is then
hierarchically clustered based on a vocabulary tree and assigned to the most similar
leaf node in the tree. The vocabulary tree is trained using feature vectors from a
set of training images. The leaf nodes in the tree are called “visual words”, and a
multimedia document is represented as a set of visual words, which is analogous to
the bag of words representation in text retrieval.
Figure 2.8: Visual words representation for multimedia
In this work, we use SIFT as the local feature to construct forensic hash. SIFT
descriptors are designed to be invariant to affine transformations. A set of affine
invariant salient points are first extracted from the scale-space representation of the
image, and then a 128-dimensional descriptor is computed for each point using the
gradient information of a region around the point. Each SIFT descriptor has an
associated characteristic scale and dominant orientation. We propose to use the
scale and orientation values between matched SIFT points of the original and the
modified images to determine the scaling factor and the rotation angle between the
two images. The overall block diagram for the alignment component construction
is shown in Fig. 2.9, and we discuss next how to perform geometric transform
estimation in the following paragraphs.
26
Figure 2.9: Block diagram for the alignment component based on visual words of
SIFT features. (Round corner box constitutes the alignment component)
Since SIFT descriptors are high-dimensional vectors, the number of SIFT
points that can be included in a compact hash representation is limited. Even
by projecting the SIFT descriptor to a 60-bit string as suggested by a recent work
by Roy and Sun [88], a hash of length 1000 bits can contain only around 5-10
points [88]. To address this challenge, we represent the SIFT features of an image
using a bag of visual words so that only a compact form of the visual word labels
but not the full descriptors need to be encoded, and such an encoding/compression
strategy significantly increases the number of SIFT points that can be included for
forensic analysis. This compact representation using visual words requires the same
vocabulary tree to be available to both the sender who generates the forensic hash
and the receiver who performs the forensic analysis. This assumption is reasonable
because the vocabulary tree only needs to be generated once or can be made publicly
available for download. As shall be seen from the experimental results in Section 2.5,
using visual words representation plays a critical role in keeping the hash compact
and providing more SIFT points for accurate and robust forensic analysis.
Geometric transform estimation Given an original image, we first extract its
SIFT points and sort them based on their contrast values. SIFT points with higher
contrast values are typically more stable against image operations such as rotation,
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scaling, and compression. For compactness, we select only SIFT points with contrast
values above a certain threshold. This threshold can be adjusted to control the size
of the alignment component. As an example, the most stable SIFT points for the
Lena image are shown in Fig. 2.10.
Figure 2.10: SIFT points with contrast value > 0.05. The size of the circle corre-
sponds to the characteristic scale of the SIFT point.
The most stable SIFT points are then assigned to different visual words by
hierarchically clustering using the vocabulary tree. Each point is represented by a
vector of 5 parameters, which is denoted as (id, x, y, σ, θ): the visual word label, the
x and y positions in the image, the scale at which the point is detected, and the
dominant direction of the point. The vectors of all the selected SIFT points form the
alignment component of the forensic hash. For a vocabulary tree with 1000 visual
words and an image size of 1024x1024, each of the 5-parameter vector would take
around 50 bits after proper quantization. Compared to the 80 bits per SIFT point
in [88], our proposed alignment component can encode roughly twice the amount
of SIFT points at the same hash length. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
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increased number of SIFT points can not only improve the robustness of geometric
transform estimation, but also contribute to locating tampering and allow more
compact representation of the integrity check component, which will be discussed
in Section 2.4.
To estimate the geometric transform applied to a modified image, we extract
SIFT points at the same contrast threshold and generate the 5-parameter vector
for each of their SIFT points. We first find matching points between the modified
image and the original image by identifying vectors with the same ID and that occur
only once in both images. These points are denoted by (p1, p̃1), (p2, p̃2), · · · , (pn, p̃n),
where pi are salient points encoded in the alignment component and p̃i are salient
points extracted from the modified image. Each matching pair gives an estimate
of the scaling factor and rotation angle as σi = σ(p̃i)/σ(pi) and θi = θ(p̃i) − θ(pi),
where σ(p) and θ(p) are the scale and orientation parameters of the SIFT point
p. There can be false matching pairs because image processing operations can
affect the SIFT descriptors, which may cause a SIFT point to be assigned to a
different visual word or result in point addition and deletion. Robust estimation
such as RANSAC [34] is then applied to estimate the actual scaling factor σ̂ and
rotation angle θ̂ from {σi, θi} and identify false matching pairs. This estimate is
further refined by considering the remaining matched SIFT points that occur more
than once in both images. Assuming that the majority of the matching points are
correct matches or the false matches do not give consistent estimates, the robust
estimation algorithm can provide accurate estimation for the geometric transform
parameters. It should be noted that further savings in the hash length can be
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achieved by representing each point with only three parameters (id, x, y) and using
only the point positions to estimate the geometric transform. The computational
complexity of such geometric transform estimation will be higher but the hash can
be more compact.
2.4 Hash Construction for Tampering Localization
The above proposed alignment component allows compact representation and
enables robust estimation of geometric transforms that an image may have under-
gone. Estimating scaling and rotation is an important step in multimedia forensics
because they are very common operations in image editing and tampering, but
can be difficult and computationally expensive to estimate using traditional non-
reference forensic techniques. Furthermore, knowledge of the transformation param-
eters allows us to compare the modified image with the original image on a common
ground, and facilitate further forensic analysis. In this section, we describe how
the alignment component of the forensic hash can enable efficient image cropping
detection and facilitate the integrity component for tampering localization.
2.4.1 Cropping Estimation
Cropping can be used by an attacker to remove important information on the
boundary of an image, and many image hashing schemes are sensitive to misalign-
ment caused by cropping. Cropping is also difficult to detect using non-reference
forensic techniques, because non-reference forensics typically rely on the traces or
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statistical changes left by certain operations, while cropping operation does not
change statistical properties of the remaining part of the image. However, we will
show that with the help from the alignment component proposed above, cropping
operation can be easily detected and estimated.
With the alignment component based on Radon transform and scale space
theory, the rotation angle of the modified image is first estimated using the 1-D
summarization of the Radon transform along the angular axis. The scaling factors
along the horizontal and vertical directions are estimated using the stable extrema
from the Radon projections f0(ρ) and f1(ρ) of the image along vertical and horizontal
directions, respectively. Cropping on the left and right boundaries of the image
incurs the corresponding amount of cropping on the respective boundaries of the
signal f0(ρ). Similarly, cropping on the top and bottom boundaries leads to the
corresponding amount of cropping on the respective boundaries of the signal f1(ρ).
Given a modified image I ′, we compute its Radon projections along the vertical
and horizontal directions to obtain f ′0(ρ) and f
′
1(ρ). The positions of the most
stable extrema of f ′0(ρ) and f
′
1(ρ) are also computed. After a moderate amount of
cropping, the majority of the extrema in f0(ρ) and f1(ρ) are still available in f
′
0(ρ)





that the number of matched extrema is maximized, as described in Section 2.3.1.
An example of the alignment is shown in Fig. 2.11, where the modified image is
a scaled and cropped version of the original Lena image. Once the two signals, fi
and f ′i , i ∈ {0, 1}, are properly aligned, the amount of cropping can be obtained by
comparing the distance between the corresponding boundaries of the two signals.
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In Fig. 2.11, dl and dr are the estimated amount of cropping on the left and right
boundaries of the original image.
With the alignment component based on visual words representation of SIFT
features, rotation and scaling are estimated using the orientation and scale infor-
mation between the matched pairs of SIFT features from the two images. Once the
modified image is transformed using the estimated parameters, the two images can
be aligned using the position information of the matched pairs of SIFT points and
cropping can be immediately estimated from the differences in the image sizes. It
should be noted that the accuracy of cropping estimation depends on the accuracy
of the geometric transform estimation, since the modified image needs to be aligned
with the original image through rotation and scaling.


































’(ρ) of test image
hash of original image
dl dr
Figure 2.11: Cropping estimation by aligning extrema from original and modified
signals
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2.4.2 Block-based Tampering Localization
In addition to cropping, an image can also be locally tampered by operations
such as cut and paste. These local tampering operations are important targets of
multimedia forensic research. Traditional non-reference forensic techniques typically
rely on the inconsistencies in image statistics caused by the local tampering opera-
tion. Such inconsistencies can be due to different JPEG quality factors [30], different
color filter array (CFA) patterns [6], or different lighting directions [49] within the
same image. Disadvantages of non-reference forensic techniques include relatively
high computational complexity and that smarter forgeries may avoid introducing
certain types of statistical inconsistencies and evade detection. If side information
can be attached, the side information can include an integrity check component that
is designed to allow for more efficient tampering detection and make it more difficult
to evade detection.
Encoding block-based features from the original image has been commonly
employed in the literature to detect local tampering. During integrity verification,
block-based features are extracted from the testing image and block-wise compar-
ison is conducted to reveal potential local tampering. Compared with tampering
localization based on inconsistencies in image statistics, as used in non-reference
multimedia forensics, block-wise comparison can locate tampering in a more effi-
cient and accurate way. For this approach to work well, the two images need to be
properly aligned before block comparison. The alignment component proposed in
the previous section offers necessary geometric registration and therefore provides a
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common ground to enable accurate block-based tampering localization.
Since a tampered part of an image usually has significant difference from the
original in terms of their gradient information, features such as edge direction his-
togram in a block have been used for tampering localization with very good re-
sults [88]. Using edge direction histogram and quantizing the pixel gradient into a
few representative directions provide robustness against small rotation and scaling
effect. In this work, we adopt such an approach to quantize pixel orientation into
four directions (horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and anti-diagonal) and compute the
edge direction histogram for each block. These edge direction histograms form the
integrity check component of the forensic hash. In Section 2.5, we will examine
the effectiveness of block-based edge histograms for tampering localization over a
larger database and the effect of different quantization methods. We will show that
compared to simple uniform quantization used in [88], non-uniform quantization of
the histogram can provide enhanced performance without increasing hash length.
2.4.3 Hybrid Scheme for Tampering Localization
To achieve higher resolution of tampering localization using block-based fea-
ture, we need to use a smaller block size and thus a higher number of blocks, which
will considerably increase the size of the integrity check component. We propose a
hybrid construction for the integrity check component, which utilizes both the block
based features and the alignment component to achieve a more compact representa-
tion. The alignment component based on visual words representation includes SIFT
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features with high contrast values. Since these SIFT features are robust against con-
tent preserving operations, if some SIFT features are missing or new SIFT features
are introduced in the modified image, the location of these SIFT changes can be an
indicator of potential image tampering. Block based features can then be used to
detect tampering in regions that do not have highly stable SIFT points. The idea
of hybrid construction is shown in Fig. 2.12, where SIFT points and their charac-
teristic scales are marked using circles. Changes to the SIFT features will indicate
potential tampering to the image regions covered by the dashed blocks, while tam-
pering in the remaining areas will be revealed by block based features, as shown by
the flowchart in Fig. 2.13.
Figure 2.12: Hybrid construction
of the integrity check component
Figure 2.13: Flow diagram for integrity
check using hybrid construction
SIFT points are typically extracted at different scales and the corresponding
descriptors capture the gradient information over image regions of different size.
Therefore, the addition or deletion of SIFT points indicates potential tampering to
the image regions covered by the corresponding SIFT points. Utilizing SIFT points
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from alignment component for tampering detection helps reduce the size of integrity
check component as we generate edge direction histograms only for blocks that are
not covered by any detected SIFT points. Depending on the number of SIFT points
selected and their distribution over the image, the savings of hash length may vary
for different images, and this will be examined experimentally in Section 2.5.
2.4.4 Securing Forensic Hash
Forensic hash can be secured to prevent unauthorized forgery using established
cryptography techniques such as symmetric encryption or public-key based digital
signature. In the traditional two-party communication scenario, one party sends
an image through an untrusted channel to the second party, who performs forensic
analysis on the received image to evaluate its trustworthiness. This scenario is
similar to image authentication considered in traditional image hashing schemes,
where the sender either attaches the encrypted robust hash to the image or sends
the hash through a separate secure channel to the receiver for authentication. The
same strategy can be used here to secure the forensic hash. Since only the sender
and receiver would know the secret key used for encrypting the forensic hash and the
separate channel is considered secure, it is very difficult for an adversary to modify
the image without being detected by the forensic analysis.
With the advancement in information technology, multimedia consumption
has gone far beyond two-party communication. A more common scenario would
involve multiple parties, where one authority party, such as news agencies or big
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media websites, provides multimedia data and distributes them over various network
channels to different users. Some of the channels may be untrusted and involve
potential tampering. The role of forensic hash is to be securely attached to the
distributed images and allow easy verification on the trustworthiness of received
image by different receivers. To allow verification, each receiver should be able to
use the forensic hash and be sure that the hash has not been modified in any way.
Digital signatures [87] can be used in such a scenario. The sender uses a secret
private key to sign the forensic hash of an image to be distributed. Then given an
image claimed to come from a specific source, any receiver can obtain a public key
from the source to verify the authenticity of the forensic hash. If the hash is indeed
signed by the trusted source, it can then be used to evaluate the trustworthiness
of the received image. Since the private key used to generate the signature is kept
secret, it is difficult for an adversary to forge an authentic hash for a tampered image
claimed from a specific source.
In addition to cryptographic encryption, randomization in feature generation
and hash construction can help further introduce uncertainty and make it difficult
for an adversary to create forgeries and mislead forensic analysis. Some prior effort
have been made for image hashing [105, 109], where randomization is introduced
into feature extraction and/or quantization steps to improve the security of the
hash. At the same time, randomization will reduce the robustness of the hash,
and such an inevitable trade-off needs to be carefully studied. Our current work
focuses on presenting the basic framework and algorithm of the new FASHION
paradigm and demonstrating its performance. How to balance forensic accuracy
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and attack resilience through randomization are challenging research issues and will
be considered in the future work.
2.5 Experimental Results
As discussed in Section 2.3, desirable properties of a forensic hash include
compactness, scalability, robustness, and distinctiveness. A compact representation
of forensic hash allows more information to be attached to the image. Scalability
offers the flexibility to improve the forensic performance by increasing the hash
length. Since an image may undergo multiple operations, robust estimation of the
target operation is also important. Furthermore, forensic hash should be distinctive
so that it is difficult to find two different images that have very similar hash content.
In this section, we examine these properties of the proposed forensic hash through
experiments.
2.5.1 Experiment Setup
In the experiment, we collect 1000 color images from the Corel database [1]
with 10 different categories, such as beach, architecture, flower, etc. The image size
is either 256x384 or 384x256. To evaluate the robustness of the forensic hash, we
perform 26 operations for each of the 1000 images, generating a database of 27000
images in total. The operations are listed in Table 2.1, including rotation, scaling,
cropping, local tampering, blurring, sharpening, and various combinations of these
operations. For the local tampering operation, we randomly select and swap two
38
blocks within the image, where the block sizes are 50x50 or 100x100. After swapping,
proper blending is introduced to avoid the sharp transition at the boundary of the
tampered regions. For each of the 1000 original images, we generate forensic hash
composed of both alignment component and integrity check component, and then
evaluate the forensic analysis performance over the 26000 modified images. For the
alignment component based on visual words representation, a vocabulary tree of
1000 visual words is first trained using SIFT descriptors collected from all color
images.
Table 2.1: Image operations and their parameters
Operations Operation parameters Variations per image /
Total number
Rotation 3◦, 5◦, 10◦, 30◦, 45◦ 5 / 5000
Scaling factor = 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1.2, 1.5 5 / 5000
Cropping 19%, 28%, 36% of image size 3 / 3000
Local tampering block size 50x50, 100x100 4 / 4000
JPEG compression Q=10 2 / 2000
Filtering Gaussian filter, Median filter (3 x 3) 2 / 2000
Enhancement Sharpening, Histogram equalization 2 / 2000
Combinations of rotation, scaling, cropping, and tampering 6 / 6000
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2.5.2 Discriminative Capability of Forensic Hash
Before evaluating the forensic capability of the forensic hash, we first study
its discriminative performance. We evaluate the capability of the forensic hash in
answering a binary question whether a received image is the same original image
except having possibly undergone certain operations or is a completely different im-
age. This discrimination is important because performing alignment on two different
images is not meaningful. The discrimination task that is carried out here has some
resemblance to but is different from the binary authentication task typically consid-
ered in the existing image hashing literature. The authentication task answers the
question whether a received image has undergone only allowable content preserving
operation or it has been maliciously tampered, while in our discrimination task, an
image having undergone local tampering is still considered as the same image rather
than a different image. Binary authentication using traditional hashing often em-
ploys the Hamming distance or L1 distance between two hashes and compares it to
a threshold for differentiation. For forensic hash, simple distance comparison is not
applicable. Instead, we exploit the confidence in geometric transform estimation as
the metric for differentiation. Two images of the same content but undergo different
operations should have a higher confidence score in geometric transform estimation
than two different images.
In the forensic hash based on Radon transform, the confidence score from rota-
tion estimation is the normalized cross-correlation between the 1-D summarizations
of the two images. The confidence score from scaling estimation is the percentage of
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extrema points that are matched between the two Radon projections. For the foren-
sic hash based on visual words, the confidence score is the percentage of matched
SIFT points between the two images.




Confidence of Radon-scaling: CRs =
# of matched extrema
total # of extrema
,




Here, h and h′ are the 1-D summarization of Radon transform of the original and
received images, respectively, which are described in Section 2.3.1, P01 is the number
of matched SIFT pairs between the two images, P0 and P1 are the number of SIFT
points in the two images, respectively. For the discrimination task, CRr + CRs is
used as the confidence value for Radon based alignment, and CVW is used as the
confidence for the visual words-based alignment.
In the discrimination experiment, each image and its modified versions are
considered as the same images. Confidence of geometric transform is computed
both among same images and between different images. We show the discrimination
performance in Fig. 2.14, where all the hashes have roughly the same length, around
700 bits. The ROC curves demonstrate the probability of correct discrimination
and the probability of false alarm at different confidence or distance thresholds. We
compare the performance with a few other representative image hashing schemes:
Roy and Sun [88], Randon soft hash (RASH) [35], and image message authentication
codes (IMAC) [120]. Among the three hashing schemes, [88] is most similar to ours
in terms of the separation of alignment and tampering detection. The scheme in [35]
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generates a hash by taking the medium point of Radon projections along a total
of 180 directions. The scheme in [120] first computes block average intensity of an
image and then extracts the most significant bit from each average value to generate
approximate authentication code.




























Forensic hash (visual words)
Image hash (Roy and Sun) [88]
Image hash (RASH) [35]
Forensic hash (Radon transform)
Image hash (IMAC) [120]
Figure 2.14: Comparison of discriminative performance. Here the discrimination
task is to distinguish images that are modified from a source image vs. images that
are completely different from the source image.
We can see that using the confidence value of geometric transform estimation,
the forensic hash based on visual words achieves the best discrimination performance
due to the distinctive power of SIFT features. The hash by Roy and Sun [88] has
slightly lower performance, because although it also uses the discriminative SIFT
features, the number of SIFT points is limited in their hash construction. The
Radon soft hash takes the medium values at each of the 180 directions, while our
Radon based construction for rotation estimation takes maximum value along only
a small subset of the 180 directions. This explains that RASH performs better
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than our Radon based alignment component for discrimination. But it should be
noted that the alignment component can provide geometric transform estimation,
which when combined with additional block-based features, can be used to align a
received image and significantly improve discrimination performance through block-
wise comparison. The schemes in [120] utilizes block-based features and is designed
to be robust against operations such as filtering, contrast/brightness adjustment,
JPEG compression, but it is not expected to be robust against such operations as
geometric transform and cropping that can cause misalignment. The advantage of
forensic hash over traditional image hash is clear: at the same compactness, the
forensic hash can not only achieve better discrimination between different images,
but also provide robust estimation of geometric transform. The alignment compo-
nent of the forensic hash thus offers a global view of the received image: to determine
whether the received image is the same original image, and if so, to align it with the
original image. This global view helps overcome the limitation of localized integrity
features with respect to misalignment and allow for integrity check and tampering
localization be carried out from aligned images in a meaningful way, which demon-
strates that different components in the forensic hash complement each other and
work together in a synergistic way.
2.5.3 Geometric Transform Estimation
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of geometric transform esti-
mation using the proposed alignment components. More specifically, we examine
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the estimation accuracy of the scaling factor and rotation angle with respect to the
length of forensic hash, i.e., the amount of available side information.
Alignment performance based on Radon transform and scale space theory
In this construction of the alignment component, rotation and scaling are estimated
using different side information. The 1-D summarization of Radon transform of
the image is downsampled to assist rotation estimation, while the stable extrema in
the Radon projection along horizontal and vertical directions are used for scaling
estimation. By increasing the hash length, more sample points and more stable
extrema can be included to improve the estimation performance. The rotation and
scaling estimation accuracy are shown in Fig. 2.15a and Fig. 2.15b, respectively.

































(a) Rotation estimation accuracy





































(b) Scaling estimation accuracy
Figure 2.15: Performance of geometric transform estimation using Radon transform
and scale space theory
In the rotation estimation experiment, we use two distance metrics when esti-
mating the rotation angle, namely, the normalized cross-correlation and L1 distance
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of the ordinal ranking of the hash. As shown in Fig. 2.15a, the normalized cross-
correlation performs consistently better than the ordinal ranking, especially at short
hash lengths. At longer hash lengths, the estimation has similar performance for
the two metrics. The rotation estimation accuracy can reach below 2 degrees with
a hash length of 10 to 15 bytes. The estimation is robust for images that have
undergone multiple operations, such as combinations of rotation, scaling, cropping,
and local tampering.
For scale estimation, we use relative estimation error as the performance met-
ric. When considering the horizontal and vertical directions separately, the estima-
tion accuracy is shown by the curve with circle markers in Fig. 2.15b. Since scaling
operation that maintains aspect ratio is done isotropically, we can estimate the scal-
ing factors along the horizontal and vertical directions, respectively, and then select
the one with higher confidence as the final estimation. This joint estimation result
is shown by the curve with star markers in Fig. 2.15b, where less than 7% relative
error can be achieved using only 5 extrema along each of the two directions, so
overall it will only add 10 bytes to the alignment component. It should be noted
that majority of the errors are contributed from images whose estimated rotation
angles are different from the actual values by more than 5 degrees. For our database
of 26000 modified images, only around 1.5% images have rotation error larger than
5 degrees, and this number can be further reduced by using longer hash lengths.
For images whose rotation estimation is accurate, the scaling estimation error is
typically below 1%.
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Alignment performance based on visual words representation For the
alignment component built on visual words representation, the most stable SIFT
features from the original image are matched to the most stable SIFT features in
the modified image to determine the scaling factor and rotation angle between the
two images. In the experiment, we vary the number of SIFT points included in
the alignment component and obtain the average estimation performance shown in
Fig. 2.16.































(a) Rotation estimation accuracy



































Relative scaling estimation error
(b) Scaling estimation accuracy
Figure 2.16: Performance of geometric transform estimation using visual words of
SIFT features
It should be noted that the number of bytes in Fig. 2.16 is for the entire
alignment component, while that in Fig. 2.15a and Fig. 2.15b is just for rotation
and scaling estimation, respectively. As can be seen from the figures, about 50
bytes of the alignment component based on visual words achieve rotation estimation
error around 3 degrees and relative scaling estimation less than 2%. At the same
hash length, the alignment component based on Radon transform has a similar
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rotation estimation error of 3 degrees but higher relative scaling estimation error
of around 5%. We can see that the two constructions of alignment component give
comparable estimation performance, and the alignment component based on visual
words has better performance on scaling estimation. A possible source of this can be
attributed to the fact that the characteristic scale associated with local SIFT points
are more reliable than extrema points from 1-D Radon projections for the task of
scaling estimation. By increasing the hash length, the estimation performance can be
further improved. Our experiments have also found that the alignment component
based on visual words is robust against various image operations such as cropping,
local tampering, and combinations of such operations with rotation and scaling.
We carry out more comparison between the two proposed alignment compo-
nents in terms of their advantages and limitations. For the alignment component
based on Radon transform and scale space theory, the scaling estimation uses Radon
projection of the image along horizontal and vertical directions. This requires the
rotation angle of the image be accurately estimated, and thus the accuracy of rota-
tion estimation will affect the performance of scaling estimation. For the alignment
component based on visual words, estimating scaling and rotation are independent
of each other. We compare the two proposed alignment components and list their
scaling estimation performance under rotation estimation error of 3, 5, and 10 de-
grees in Table 2.2. We can see that scaling estimation performance degrades for
the alignment based on Radon transform as the rotation estimation error increases,
while alignment based on visual words maintains very good estimation accuracy.
It should be noted that for over 90% of the modified images in our database, the
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Table 2.2: Relative scaling estimation error using different alignment algorithms
Rotation error 3o 5o 10o 36% cropping
Radon transform based alignment 7.17% 11.69% 18.58% 6.27%
Visual words based alignment 1.13% 1.54% 1.37% 0.26%
Robust hash by Roy and Sun [88] 2.62% 13.2% 10.21% 1.81%
rotation estimation error is less than 1o and thus the scaling estimation using Radon
transform based alignment is accurate for most cases.
Another difference between the two alignment constructions is that the Radon
transform based alignment uses global Radon projection features, while the visual
words based alignment uses local SIFT features. Radon transform based alignment
is less robust to large amount of local tampering and cropping, because a large
amount of tampering may change the Radon projection of the image along most
directions significantly, while for visual words based alignment, SIFT features in the
untampered regions can still provide useful information for forensic analysis. In Ta-
ble 2.2, we can see that when 36% of the image is cropped, the alignment component
based on Radon transform performs worse than the alignment component based on
visual words.
The performance of visual words based alignment depends on reliable matching
of SIFT features between the testing and original images. At short hash length
where only a few SIFT points can be included, the matching may not be reliable for
images that have undergone tampering operations which may alter the original SIFT
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features. In such cases, the Radon-based alignment component may be preferred to
obtain a rough estimation of geometric transform.
Overall, the two alignment components both provide accurate and robust ge-
ometric transform estimation. The visual words based construction gives better
scaling estimation and more robust to large amount cropping and local tampering,
while the Radon transform based construction can provide robust estimation at
shorter hash lengths.
Comparisons with representative prior art We compare the performance of
geometric transform estimation between our proposed alignment components and
the robust image hashing work by Roy and Sun [88], which is most relevant to
our work in terms of localization capability and global robustness through image
registration. As reviewed in the introduction section, the image hash in [88] contains
registration component to estimate the geometric transform before doing image
authentication. Five most stable SIFT features are selected and their positions are
included in the hash. To improve the compactness of the hash, the 128-dimensional
SIFT descriptor is projected onto a Gaussian random matrix to generate a 60-bit
binary string, which is similar in spirit to locality sensitive hashing. These 60-bit
binary strings are included in the hash and used for matching purposes. Each SIFT
point takes about 10 bytes and the registration component is around 50 bytes.
When implementing the Roy-Sun hash, we select most stable SIFT features
based on their contrast values, because higher contrast values indicate better sta-
bility. When tested on the Corel image database, the Roy-Sun hash achieved an
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average of 10 degrees error on rotation estimation and 11% relative error for scaling
estimation using the 50-byte registration component. At the same hash length, our
proposed alignment components can achieve around 3 degree rotation error and 1%
scaling error. Our proposed schemes also provide better scalability, as the estima-
tion performance can be further increased when increasing the hash length. For
Roy-Sun hash, each additional SIFT point will increase the hash length by 10 bytes,
thus it requires roughly twice the length of our proposed schemes in order to achieve
the same estimation accuracy.
The main limitation of the registration component in [88] is the limited num-
ber of SIFT points that are included. The most stable SIFT points can change
after the image has undergone some operations, such as cropping, local tampering,
and rotation. Some SIFT points may be removed from the image due to cropping
or local tampering, and new points can be introduced into the image after local
content change. Fig. 2.17 shows an example, in which we can see that the SIFT
points with the highest contrast values can be changed or removed after small con-
tent modification. As a result, there can be fewer than 5 matching pairs between
the original and modified images, and the reduced number of matched pairs leads
to less robust estimation results or makes it difficult to provide any reasonable esti-
mates. In contrast, the proposed alignment components are designed to be robust
against common image operations. In the alignment component based on visual
words representation, more SIFT points are included and help achieve more robust
estimation performance.
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(a) Original image (b) Modified image
Figure 2.17: Five most stable SIFT points in the original image and the modified
image.
2.5.4 Tampering Detection and Localization
In the modular design of the FASHION framework, the alignment component
provides a global view of a received image to determine whether it is modified from
the same original image and perform the necessary alignment. This global view
facilitates other components such as the integrity check component in providing a
finer resolution forensic analysis including tampering detection and localization.
Integrity check performance with block-based features As described in Sec-
tion 2.4, the integrity check component can be constructed using block-based edge
direction histograms from the original image. An example of tampering localization
is shown in Fig. 2.19. For tampering localization, the choice of block size controls
the trade-off between hash length and detection resolution. A larger block size gives
a smaller hash length but can introduce higher false detection than a smaller block
size. The edge direction histogram in each block is quantized in order to achieve a
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compact representation. We examine the tampering localization performance over
our image database and compare the performance using uniform quantization and
Lloyd quantization for the edge-direction histogram in Fig. 2.18. The block size is
chosen to be 16 by 16. ROC curves are obtained by quantizing each component
of the edge direction histogram to 4 bits using a uniform quantization and a Lloyd
quantization, respectively. It can be observed from Fig. 2.18 that at the same hash
length, the Lloyd quantization significantly improves tampering localization perfor-
mance compared to using uniform quantization. This suggests that using Lloyd
quantization leads to a more compact hash because we can show that using 1 byte
per block with Lloyd quantization can achieve similar performance to that of using
2 bytes per block with uniform quantization. Furthermore, a 90% correct detection
of tampered pixels with less than 3% false detection rate can be achieved, indicating
accurate tampering localization. Not all tampered pixels may be detected because
the tampered regions may not align with the image blocks, and a small number of
tampered pixels in one block may not cause significant changes in the edge direction
histogram of that block.
Integrity check performance with hybrid construction One limitation of
the integrity check component with block-based features is that in order to achieve
high localization accuracy and accommodate large image size, the number of blocks
and thus the hash length will increase significantly. To ensure the compactness of
the forensic hash, we have proposed a hybrid construction for the integrity check
component in Section 2.4.3. The idea of the hybrid construction is to utilize informa-
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Figure 2.18: Tampering localization performance
tion from the alignment component to assist tampering localization, thus reducing
the amount of information needed from the integrity check component. In our hy-
brid construction, the addition and deletion of SIFT points between the original
and testing images is also used for tampering detection. Block-based features are
used to detect tampering only for regions where no highly stable SIFT points are
detected at the given contrast value, which substantially reduces the length of the
forensic hash. For the Corel database, if block-based features are extracted from
32x32 blocks and a total of 20 SIFT points are encoded, we can reduce the number
of block features by 30% on average. If the edge histogram is quantized to 1 byte per
block using non-uniform quantization, we can save around 80 bytes on the integrity
check component. The overall length of the integrity check component depends on
the image size, block size, and quantization levels. An example of the tampering
detection and localization using the hybrid construction is shown in Fig. 2.20. The
tampered regions detected by block-based features are marked by solid blocks and
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(a) Original image (b) Tampered image
(c) Tampering localization
Figure 2.19: Example of tampering localization using block-based feature. (Original
image source: Flickr)
regions detected by SIFT points are marked by dashed blocks. The SIFT points
that do not match between the original and modified images are denoted by solid
circles.
For tampering detection and localization using SIFT features, we have higher
confidence that a region may be tampered if a larger number of SIFT points are not
matched between the original and the modified images in that region. However, we
have observed from experiments that a small amount of addition and deletion to
SIFT points can occur due to content preserving operations, such as geometric trans-
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Figure 2.20: Tampering localization using the hybrid integrity check component
(This figure is better viewed in color version of the dissertation)
form, filtering, compression, and others. These image operations may affect SIFT
descriptors and can cause the descriptors to be assigned to different visual words
during clustering. This may reduce the number of matched SIFT points between
two images, which will in turn lower the confidence of tampering detection for re-
gions with fewer matched SIFT points. We expect better clustering schemes such as
soft clustering and more robust SIFT matching schemes can improve the robustness
of visual words representation and provide more reliable tampering detection.
2.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new concept and framework of forensic hash as
a compact representation of side information from the original image to facilitate
forensic analysis. Two novel constructions of the hash are proposed, utilizing Radon
transform, scale space theory and visual words representation of SIFT features. At
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the same compactness as the conventional image hash, the forensic hash can go
beyond binary authentication and reliably detect geometric transform and estimate
the transform parameters; when compared to the blind multimedia forensics, the
forensic hash can answer a broader scope of forensic questions more accurately and
efficiently. Furthermore, the performance of the forensic hash can be improved
by moderately increasing the hash length, and the modular design of forensic hash
provides flexibility and extensibility to suit for different applications. The geometric
transform offered by the forensic hash serves as an important building block for
further locating tampering using block-based features. We have also demonstrated
very good image discrimination capability of the forensic hash. In future work,
we plan to design more forensic modules to enrich the forensic capability of the
forensic hash, and investigate means to further complement cryptographic approach
in securing hash and mitigating attacks.
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CHAPTER 3
Forensic Hash: Applications and Extensions
In this chapter, we demonstrate several extensions and applications of the
FASHION framework proposed in Chapter 2. A good design of forensic hash should
have good extensibility in answering a broader scope of forensic questions by intro-
ducing new modules or using existing modules. In the first part of the chapter, we
show that the forensic hash that we proposed in the previous chapter is very effec-
tive at estimating advanced image editing operations such as seam carving, without
changing the hash design. In the second part, we extend the FASHION spirit to the
task of reduced-reference quality assessment on retargeted images, where compact
side information is used to provide structure distortion analysis caused by retarget-
ing operations.
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3.1 Seam Carving Estimation using Forensic Hash
3.1.1 Background and Motivation
In recent years, mobile devices with multimedia capturing capability and social
networks that provide media sharing and streaming services are rapidly emerging.
Given the various screen sizes of the mobile devices, properly resizing multimedia
data to better render them on smaller screen sizes becomes important. One group of
techniques called retargeting [89], or content-adaptive resizing, address such problem
by resizing an image or video without scaling down or distorting the salient content
inside too much. Seam carving is one representative image retargeting technique,
proposed by Avidan et al. [4]. It resizes an image in a way adaptive to its content
by removing seams, which are eight-connected paths of low energy, from the image
while keeping salient objects intact. Details on the seam carving algorithm can be
found in [4]. Due to its capability of preserving salient objects and its aspect ratio
after resizing, seam carving has found promising applications in rendering images
and videos on smaller displays, such as mobile phones. In this section, we develop
forensic techniques [69] to detect seam carving and estimate its parameters for the
purpose of trustworthiness evaluation.
The main objective of seam carving is better image resizing, but as demon-
strated in [4], seam carving can also be used to intentionally remove objects from the
image. Such tampering brings challenges to forensic tasks. Traditional blind multi-
media forensics try to detect potential tampering of digital images/videos without
proactive aids such as signature attachment or embedded watermark [24]. This is
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accomplished by analyzing intrinsic traces, such as inconsistencies in signal char-
acteristics, left by the processing operations [96]. However, the adaptive nature of
seam carving makes it difficult to identify any traces or inconsistencies unique to the
operation. Recent work by Sarkar et al. [94] and Fillion et al. [33] detect whether an
image has undergone seam carving or not by using a machine learning framework
based on intuitive features extracted from the image. Th accuracy of seam carving
detection in the above mentioned works is around 80-90% for large amount of seam
carving (e.g., number of seams larger than 30% of original image size), and becomes
lower for a smaller amount of seam carving. In contrast to answering only a binary
question of whether the image is seam carved or not using blind forensic techniques,
in this section, we explore using compact side information to not only detect seam
carving but also estimate the amount and location of seam carving. Such detailed
information can help us better evaluate the trustworthiness of the image.
Utilizing compact side information for enhanced forensic analysis is the main
spirit of the FASHION framework that we proposed in the previous chapter. A good
design of forensic hash should good extensibility such that it can answer a broader
scope of forensic questions by adding new forensic modules or reusing existing mod-
ules. In this section, we use the forensic hash based on visual words representation
of SIFT features [67], which is proposed in Section 2.3.2 and extend it for seam
carving detection and estimation. Experiments show that forensic hash can accu-
rately estimate the amount of seam carving and their approximate locations. With
the estimation results, we further explored reconstruction of original image from the
seam carved image for tampering detection. Such a forensic analysis can provide
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a detailed trustworthiness evaluation of the image in terms of which part can be
trusted and which part might be tampered.
3.1.2 Seam Carving Estimation
Below, we formally describe the seam carving estimation algorithm using foren-
sic hash. We denote the original image as I and its forensic hash h = {v1,v2, · · · ,vk},
where vi is the parameter vector of the i
th stable SIFT point in I. Image I is trans-
mitted and undergoes seam carving and potentially additional geometric transforms
and tampering operations such as cut-and-paste. We denote the received image as
Ĩ and its top stable SIFT points as h̃ = {ṽ1, ṽ2, · · · , ṽk}. Given h and h̃, we match
their SIFT points based on their visual word IDs and denote the matched points as
(p1, p̃1), (p2, p̃2),· · · ,(pn, p̃n). Before seam carving estimation, we first need to make
sure Ĩ is on the same scale and orientation as I. This is achieved by estimating the
rotation angle θ and scaling factor δ using the matched points, as described in [67].
The image Ĩ is then transformed to be S(R(̃I,−θ), 1/δ), thus aligned to I. Here
R(·, ·) is the rotation operator and S(·, ·) is the scaling operator. For simplicity,
below we still denote the transformed image as Ĩ.
To locate the vertical seams removed from the image, we sort the matched
points based on their x-coordinates and then compare the distances between every
adjacent matched pairs. An illustrative example is given in Fig. 3.1, where xi, xi+1,
xi+2 are the x-coordinates of three adjacent points from original image I and x̃i, x̃i+1,
x̃i+2 are the x-coordinates of corresponding points in the resized image Ĩ. We denote
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the distance between two adjacent points in I as di = xi+1 − xi and the distance
between corresponding points in Ĩ as d̃i = x̃i+1−x̃i, then the number of vertical seams
removed in the horizontal range [x̃i, x̃i+1] in Ĩ can be computed as ∆Ci = di − d̃i.
A positive ∆Ci indicates seam removal and a negative one indicates seam insertion.
For the example given in Fig. 3.1, we can see that there are seam insertions in
the range [x̃i, x̃i+1] and seam removal in the range [x̃i+1, x̃i+2]. After considering
all adjacent matched pairs, we obtain the estimation results {∆Ci, x̃i, x̃i+1} where
i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Furthermore, in order to estimate the number of seams removed
before the first point p̃1 and that after the last point p̃n, we can include the size of the
original image into the forensic hash and obtain the complete estimation results as
{∆Ci, x̃i, x̃i+1} where i ∈ {0, · · · , n+1}, ∆C0 = x1−x̃1, ∆Cn+1 = (w−xn)−(w̃−x̃n).
w and w̃ are the width of images I and Ĩ, respectively. To locate horizontal seams,
we sort the matched points along y-coordinates and follow the same procedure.
Figure 3.1: Vertical seam estimation using x-coordinates of matched SIFT point
pairs
To give an example, we show the original image and its 50 vertical seams to
be removed in Fig. 3.2a. The resized image and its stable SIFT points with contrast
value larger than 0.05 are shown in Fig. 3.2b. The green circles are SIFT points
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matched with the original SIFT points encoded in the forensic hash and red ones
are those not matched due to seam removal. By comparing the original and new
distances of every adjacent pairs of matched points, we estimated that there are 30
vertical seams removed in the horizontal range of [1,9] in the resized image, 2 seams
in the range of [9,30], 17 seams in the range of [285,363], and 1 seam in the range
of [404,418]. Compared with ground truth knowledge, we have correctly estimated
all 50 seams with no false alarm.
(a) Original image and its 50 vertical seams (b) Image after seam carving and its stable
SIFT points
Figure 3.2: Illustration of seam carving estimation (This figure is better viewed in
color)
It should be noted that such capability of estimating the amount and location
of removed seams does not require modifying the hash construction in [67]. This
shows that a good design of forensic hash can be used to answer a broad scope of
forensic questions. The estimation here provides the regions in the received image
where seam carving has occurred. This information is very helpful to reconstruct the
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original image and enable further forensic analysis such as tampering localization,
as will be demonstrated in the next section.
3.1.3 Image Reconstruction and Tampering Localization
Knowing where and how many seams have been removed is an important
first step to evaluate image trustworthiness. Places with seam removal are less
trustworthy than regions without seam carving. In this section, we explore how to
further use such information to adaptively resize a received image to align with the
original image and thus enable tampering localization through block-wise feature
comparison.
There are several ways to resize the seam carved image. Without any knowl-
edge about the seam carving amount and location, a näıve resizing option is to
resize the image or insert seams in the image. Such strategies cannot align the two
images accurately and may make block-based comparison unreliable. In contrast,
knowledge of the seam carving estimation can guide the reconstruction process by
constraining the resizing or seam insertion to only those regions that have under-
gone seam carving and with only the necessary amount. More specifically, with
estimation result {∆Ci, x̃i, x̃i+1}, i.e., ∆Ci seams have been removed in the hori-
zontal range [x̃i, x̃i+1] of image Ĩ, we increase the width of Ĩ by ∆Ci through either
rescaling the vertical strip [x̃i, x̃i+1] or inserting ∆Ci seams into the same range.
Since the shape of a seam is irregular and its pixels may not all fall into a vertical
strip, we insert seams that have at least half of its pixels in the specified range.
63
Similarly for resized image due to seam insertion, we can reconstruct the original
image by removing seams from the resized image.
To illustrate the accuracy of such reconstruction and alignment, we show an
example below. For the same image in Fig. 3.2b, we apply simple seam insertion
without any constraints and seam insertion with constraints based on the estimation
results to resize the image to its original size. The difference between the resized
results and the original image are shown in Fig. 3.3a and Fig. 3.3b, respectively,
where the difference is shown as a color image and black color indicates zero error.
We can see that the constrained seam insertion can provide accurate alignment
between the resized image and original image, while simple insertion without any
constraints mis-aligned the two images, causing large errors in many places of the
image. The PSNR is 14.8 dB for simple insertion and 22.8 dB for constrained
insertion.
Since the original image is not available during forensic analysis, compact
block-based features can be encoded into the forensic hash as an integrity check
component for tampering localization. The block feature used here is edge pixel
direction histogram, quantized to four directions and has size of 1 byte per block,
as described in [67]. Using block size of 32 by 32, the average block feature dis-
tance is 65.05 for simple insertion and 15.02 for constrained insertion. The accurate
alignment achieved by adaptive reconstruction that utilizes seam carving estima-
tion result is very important, as it enables tampering localization using block-based
features, which are not robust to misalignment. As can be seen from Fig. 3.3a, mis-
alignment may cause the block-based comparison to consider untampered regions
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as tampered.
(a) Näıve reconstruction error (b) Constrained reconstruction error
Figure 3.3: Difference between original and reconstructed image using seam insertion
without and with constraints
With the knowledge of seam carving amount and locations, we resize each
given range using simple scaling or seam insertion. For example, if seam carving
estimation reveals that a vertical strip with horizontal range [10,29] has been carved
20 seams, we can resize this strip to a new width of 40 through scaling or inserting
20 new seams that pass through this vertical strip.
For large resizing amount, constrained scaling and constrained seam insertion
both produce a blurred result and seam insertion may introduce additional distor-
tion along edges. For small resizing amount, seam insertion is a better option than
scaling in the sense that it can avoid blurness. Another case that seam insertion
produces better reconstruction than scaling is when the removed seams have irregu-
lar shapes or going diagonal directions. In this case, scaling a vertical or horizontal
strip will distort the image content. An example is given in Fig. 6. The original
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(a) Original image (b) Reconstructed image using constrained
scaling
(c) Reconstructed image using con-
strained seam insertion
Figure 3.4: Image reconstruction example
image and its removed seams are shown in Fig. 3.4a. The reconstructed images
using constrained scaling and constrained seam insertion are shown in Fig. 3.4b and
Fig. 3.4c, respectively. We can see that the removed seams in the lower center region
of the original image moves in a diagonal direction, therefore, scaling will produce a
blurred strip in the center of the resized image (Fig. 3.4b) while the seam insertion
can avoid such distortion in the image content (Fig. 3.4c).
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Reconstructing the exact original image from a seam carved image is a chal-
lenging and open problem, but for the purpose of aligning the resized image with
the original image for tampering detection, both the constrained scaling and con-
strained seam insertion work well and we will show more experiments in the next
section.
3.1.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we perform several experiments to evaluate the performance
of seam carving estimation and tampering detection using forensic hash. The image
dataset used in the section includes 200 images from Flickr with 40 different tags,
such as beach, building, flower, etc. The image size is about 500x300. For each of
the 200 images, we perform seam carving along its larger dimension and generate
four resized images whose modified dimension has 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% of the
original size, respectively. The total number of resized images is 800.
Robust geometric transform estimation To estimate seam carving, the mod-
ified image should be first aligned with the original image to the same orientation
and scale. Such alignment can be achieved through geometric transform estimation
using forensic hash. Here, we validate the robustness of such alignment against
seam carving operation. For an image undergone seam carving operation, a robust
geometric transform estimation should report a scaling factor close to 1. The esti-
mation results on the 800 resized images are shown in Table 3.1, which shows the
absolute rotation angle estimation error and relative scaling factor estimation error.
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We can see that estimation errors remain low even at large amount of seam carving.
Table 3.1: Robustness of forensic hash against seam carving
Resize factor 90% 80% 70% 60%
Rotation error 0.06 0.26 0.97 2.82
Scaling error 0.18% 0.76% 1.88% 3.37%
Seam carving estimation After geometric alignment, we can estimate the amount
and position of removed seams as described in Section 3.1.2. By comparing with
the ground truth seam carving amount, we evaluate the estimation accuracy using
probability of correct detection (Pd) and probability of false detection (Pf ), which












∆Ĉi is the estimated seam carving amount in the range given by the ith matched
SIFT pairs, ∆Ci is the actual carving amount in the same range, and ∆C is the
ground truth value of total number of seams that have been removed.
We perform estimation on the 800 images with different resize factors. The
probability of correct detection and false detection at different hash lengths are
shown in Table 3.2. With hash length at around 50 bytes, the average probability of
correct detection is 99.4% and average probability of false detection is 2%. We can
also see that longer hash length may not improve the estimation accuracy. Actually,
when more SIFT points are used, there is higher chance of mismatch of SIFT points
and we see slight decrease in estimation accuracy.
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Table 3.2: Seam carving estimation performance
Hash length (bytes) 47 94 156 219
Prob. of correct detection 99.4% 98.6% 98.6% 98.3%
Prob. of false detection 1.99% 3.52% 4.26% 3.48%
Reconstruction and alignment We perform reconstruction using both the con-
strained scaling and constrained seam insertion guided by the seam carving estima-
tion results over the 800 images. The PSNR and block feature distance between
the original image and the reconstructed image using a forensic hash of 47 bytes
are shown in Fig. 3.5. Fig. 3.5a shows the PSNR of the reconstructed image at
different seam carving resize factors. We can see that constrained seam insertion
consistently outperforms the constrained scaling, and the reconstruction quality is
better if the seam carving amount is smaller, i.e., the resize factor is large. Fig. 3.5b,
compares the average block feature distances of the two methods, and again we can
see constrained seam insertion has better performance.
Tampering localization By adaptively resizing the seam carved image, we can
accurately align it with the original image for tampering localization. We illustrate
one example below. The original image is shown in Fig. 3.6a and its tampered
version is shown in Fig. 3.6b. The tampered image has undergone seam carving
to remove the central building and then cut-and-paste to insert a plane. Our seam
carving estimation correctly identifies that there are 125 missing seams in the center
of the tampered image. After adaptive resizing using constrained scaling, the result
69



































































(b) Average block feature distance
Figure 3.5: Reconstruction and alignment performance
of block-wise comparison of edge-direction histogram is shown in Fig. 3.6c. Both
the center region where the building has been removed and the inserted plane are
correctly identified as tampered, as covered by red blocks. Therefore, using forensic
hash and additional block-based features, we can provide a detailed report on the
trustworthiness of an image, in terms of which part can be trusted and which part
might be tampered.
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(a) Original image (b) Tampered image
(c) Tampering detection result
Figure 3.6: Example of reconstruction and tampering localization
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3.2 Reduced-Reference Quality Assessment for Retargeted Images
The study of estimating seam carving using compact SIFT representations
motivates us to further extend the FASHION spirit to the more general image re-
targeting operations, and in this section, we study the problem of using compact
side information to evaluate quality of images that have undergone retargeting.
Identifying and quantifying image quality degradation is very important in order
to maintain and control image quality in various applications and online services.
Image quality assessment research aims at developing techniques to predict image
quality accurately and automatically. Below, we first review the related work on
image quality assessment and image retargeting, then we discuss the main idea and
contributions of this work.
3.2.1 Related Work and Our Contributions
The most reliable way of assessing image quality is by subjective evaluation
involving human observers. The mean opinion score (MOS) is one of the commonly
used and well regarded subjective measure for image quality assessment. However,
involving human observers can be expensive and too slow to be useful for practical
applications. Therefore, the goal of objective image quality assessment is to design
computational models such that an estimated quality by the models correlates well
with human subjectivity. Depending on the amount of available information of the
original reference image, image quality assessment can be classified into full reference
(the reference image is fully available), reduced reference (only partial information
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about the reference image is available), and no reference (no access to the reference
image is allowed).
The simplest and most widely used full reference quality metric is the mean
square error (MSE) and related metric of peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR). Al-
though simple, MSE and PSNR are not well matched to the perceived visual qual-
ity of human beings. Taking advantage of known characteristics of human visual
system (HVS), most state-of-the-art quality assessment works have adopted a two-
stage structure, namely, local distortion measure and spatial pooling to get a final
quality score. Some representative local distortion measures include structure sim-
ilarity (SSIM) index [111, 113], block discrete cosine transform [116] and wavelet-
based approaches [107,117]. These local quality measures are then pooled together
to maximize the correlation between objective and subjective image quality rat-
ings [27,55,56,114]. A comprehensive survey of image quality assessment techniques
can be found in [112].
Image retargeting is one type of techniques that provide content-adaptive im-
age resizing for better viewing images on screens of different sizes. The seam carving
algorithm that we studied in the previous section in this chapter is one particular
type of retargeting techniques. Image retargeting methods can be roughly classified
as discrete or continuous [97]. Discrete approaches remove or insert unimportant
pixels or patches from the interior of the images [4, 90, 91]. In such approaches,
seams with minimum energy are removed from the image for resizing. The results
are promising, although at large scale changes, visible discontinuities or aliasing
artifacts can often be seen. Continuous retargeting techniques optimize a map-
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ping (warp) from the source media size to the target size without explicit content
removal. The key idea of such approaches is to scale visually important feature re-
gions uniformly while allowing arbitrary deformations in unimportant regions of the
image. Some representative works include [54, 110, 118]. A comprehensive compar-
ison of state-of-the-art image retargeting techniques can be found in a recent work
by Rubinstein et al. [89].
In this work, we study the problem of reduced-reference quality assessment for
retargeted images. Exploring reduced-reference quality assessment is partly moti-
vated by the work of forensic hash that we proposed earlier in this thesis. The idea
of attaching a short signature about the original image before image transmission
to assist forensic analysis can also be carried out to the task of quality assessment.
Given that the original reference image is seldom fully available in many real-world
applications, reduced-reference quality assessment will be a more feasible alterna-
tive, where the compact partial information can be embedded into the header file
of the image and be used to monitor and assess image quality.
The motivation of applying quality assessment on retargeted images is two-
fold. First, media consumption on mobile devices is becoming an inevitable trend,
therefore, image retargeting techniques will see greater use in many real-world ap-
plications. Quality assessment on retargeted image can play an important role in
monitoring and ensuring the experience of mobile media consumption. Second, con-
ventional image quality assessment work typically focus on distortion caused by
operations, such as compression, additive noise, blurring, and contrast/brightness
changes. These types of distortions mainly alter the intensity and noise level of the
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image, but do not change the image size and the content structure inside the image.
Therefore, exact correspondence can be established to compute local distortion in
the full-reference scenario. Retargeting operations, on the other hand, bring unique
challenges to quality assessment, because the internal structure of the image content
will be changed and the distortion will be mainly structural rather than noise or
intensity change. Such challenges call for new techniques that can explicitly measure
image quality degradation due to structure changes.
The contributions of our work include: (1) We extend the idea of forensic
hash for the application of quality assessment of retargeted images in a reduced-
reference scenario. (2) We focus on distortions caused by image structure changes,
which are different from distortions of noise and intensity changes typically consid-
ered in conventional quality assessment work. (3) We propose novel algorithms for
the structural distortion analysis, and provide not only a single quality score, but
also a detailed distortion map that can be used to assist human evaluation. The
quality assessment results from our proposed algorithm can have many extended
applications, such as classifying different retargeting operations and reconstructing
the original image from the retargeted one.
In the rest of section, we first describe the framework of the quality assessment
algorithm in Section 3.2.2. Then we present the details of the algorithm in Sections
3.2.3 and 3.2.4, including selecting partial information and structural distortion
analysis using such partial information. Finally, we present some examples of the
quality assessment results in Section 3.2.5.
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3.2.2 Quality Assessment Framework
In this work, we consider reduced-reference quality assessment, which means
that only partial information from the original image is available to evaluate quality
degradation. As we mentioned earlier, the distortion considered here is mainly
structural changes caused by the retargeting operations. Therefore, the partial
information needs to compactly capture the structure information of the image and
allow robust analysis of structure changes. The partial information used in this work
is strong corner points from the original image. After retargeting, the corner points
from the retargeted image will be matched against the corner points encoded in the
partial information. After matching, we can obtain a detailed distortion map of how
different parts of the image are changed from the original reference image. Finally,
such a distortion map is analyzed by taking into account of the image saliency to
produce a quality score that measures the amount of structural distortion. The
overall framework of the proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Overall framework of reduced-reference quality assessment for retargeted
images
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The output of this quality assessment algorithm includes the distortion map
that describes the structural distortion of the retargeted image in detail and a qual-
ity score computed from the distortion map. The role of the quality score is similar
to that in conventional quality assessment work, i.e., to predict the quality degrada-
tion as would be perceived by a human observer. In the case of structural distortion,
recent study by Rubinstein et al. [89] found that even human beings have difficul-
ties in judging quality of retargeted images and have large discrepancies on how
important is each type of distortions, such as content loss, symmetry violation, dis-
torted edges/lines, and deformed objects/faces, etc. Therefore, providing a detailed
distortion map in addition to a single quality score can be very important to assist
subjective quality assessment on the retargeted images. In the next two sections, we
provide detailed discussion on each component in the proposed quality assessment
algorithm.
3.2.3 Partial Information Selection
In order to evaluate structural distortion, the partial information that we select
for quality assessment needs to capture the structure information of the reference
image. Image structure can be captured by edges. However, using edge map as
partial information is not compact enough. To compactly capture image structure
information, we use corner points in this work. There have been wide variety of
interest point and corner point detectors in the literature. They can be divided
into three categories: contour based, intensity based, and parametric model based
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methods. A comprehensive survey and comparison of local interest point detectors
can be found in [95].
In this work, we use the corner point detection method proposed by Harris and
Stephens [44], where the corner points roughly capture the structure information of
the image as they typically locate on dominant image structures, and they are also
efficient to compute as compared to more computationally intensive local features
such as SIFT. The Harris corner point detector identifies corner points using the
gray value information of the local patch around the point. More specifically, a












Here, Ix and Iy are the partial derivative of the image intensity along horizontal
and vertical directions. w(u, v) are the weights assigned to each neighboring pixel.
A Gaussian weighting can be applied to provide an isotropic response. A corner
point can then be characterized by analyzing the eigenvalues of the Harris matrix
A. Denote the two eigenvalues of A as λ1 and λ2. If λ1 ≈ 0 and λ2 ≈ 0, the pixel
(x, y) is not an corner point nor an edge point. If λ1(λ2) has large positive value
and λ2(λ1) ≈ 0, then an edge point is found. If both λ1 and λ2 have large positive
values, the pixel (x, y) is considered a corner point. For efficient detection of corner
points, the following function det(A)− k · trace2(A) involving only determinant and
trace of A can be used instead of computing the eigenvalues.
Since the partial information needs to be compact, we will need to control the
number of corner points that are selected. First, we would like the corner points
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to appear on major object or structure inside the image, rather than capturing
small details such as texture on the background. To suppress noise and retain only
corner points on salient objects, we perform smoothing on the image before doing
the corner point detection. A large amount of blurring can remove noisy corner
points that might appear on smaller edges that may not be useful for evaluating the
global structure distortion. Second, to avoid large amount of corner points in a small
neighborhood, local maximum suppression is necessary to retain only the dominant
corner in a local patch. The larger window for the local maximum suppression,
the more spread we can expect from the detected corner points. An example of
corner point detection is shown in Fig. 3.8, where we can see that a larger maximum
suppression window causes the detected corner points to spread out more.
(a) Corner points (window size = 3) (b) Corner points (window size = 15)
Figure 3.8: Corner points detected at different maximum suppression window sizes.
After corner points are detected, we need to compactly encode their positions.
By considering the corner map as a binary image, where corner points are repre-
sented by value 1 and all other pixels in the image have value 0, we can use the
JBIG2 encoding [78] to compactly represent such a binary image. JBIG2 is an in-
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ternational standard that provides a very good compression ratio for binary images
and serves as a good candidate for our application. The size of JBIG2 compressed
corner map with respect to different number of corner points is shown in Table 3.3.
For comparison, we also show the size of the corner map encoded by PNG format.
We can see that JBIG2 compression provides more than 40% savings in representing
the partial information of corner points than simple PNG encoding.
Table 3.3: Compact encoding of corner points
# of corner points 50 80 100 120 150 200
JBIG2 size (byte) 225 276 310 339 391 469
PNG size (byte) 380 475 541 598 682 852
3.2.4 Structural Distortion Analysis
To evaluate structure distortion, we first need to measure how the corner
points from the original reference image change in the retargeted image. Since
retargeting operation will introduce highly non-linear and adaptive changes to the
image structure, a robust matching between corresponding corner points between
the original and retargeted images is very important to enable accurate distortion
measure. After finding an accurate correspondence of corner points, we can then
analyze the distortion and compute the quality score. Next, we describe each step
in the structural distortion analysis.
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Robust matching of corner points The algorithm of corner points matching
is shown in Fig. 3.9. The first step is to find an optimal alignment between the
binary corner map from the original image and the retargeted images. This step is
important as it helps mitigate the effect of cropping which is a common operation
in retargeting. In the second step, we establish corner point correspondence that
minimizes some cost function. Finally in the third step, we perform outlier removal
to remove false correspondences and get the final matching result.
Figure 3.9: Three steps in finding corner point correspondence
Since the retargeted image may have undergone cropping, we will first align
the binary corner map with the retargeted image so that the point correspondence
can be found more accurately. The process of finding such an optimal alignment
is shown in Fig. 3.10. Given the retargeted image, we first compute its edge map





Here, E is the edge map of the retargeted image, dtE is the distance transformed
image, pe is a point in E, and p is a point in dtE. After distance transform, we obtain
an image where each pixel’s value represents its distance to the closest edge. To find
the optimal alignment, we overlay the corner map from the original image onto
the distance transformed image at different shift positions. For each shift poisition
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dtE(pc + s). (3.3)
Here, pc is the corner point position, s is the shift, N is the total number of corner
points encoded in the partial information. A smaller distance indicates that most of
the corner points are located closer to the edges in the retargeted image, therefore,
a better alignment. The optimal alignment is then computed as the shift s∗ that
gives the minimum Chamfer distance.
Figure 3.10: Finding optimal alignment between corner points and retargeted image
After alignment, we will compute the correspondence between the corner
points from the original image to the corner points in the retargeted image. Re-
targeting operation changes the internal structure of the image by scaling, carving,
and warping. Therefore, the task here is to find correspondence between two sets
of points, where one set of points are deformed from the other set of points. This
task is very similar to the task of shape matching, where one shape needs to be
matched against another similar but deformed shape. Shape context proposed by
Belongie et al. [7] is a useful technique for shape matching, and we use it here to
find correspondence between corner points.
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Shape context is a local descriptor associated with each shape point or corner
point to describe the coarse distribution of the rest of corner points with respect
to the current point. An illustration on how to compute shape context is shown in
Fig. 3.11, where the two sets of points represent the same character “A” but has
slightly different shapes. For each point, its shape context is essentially a histogram
counting the number of other points that fall into each of the bins shown in the
right-most part of the figure. Different bins capture shape information in different
orientation and distance relative to the current point.
Figure 3.11: Illustration of shape context computation (Figure from Belongie et
al. [7])
With shape context computed for each corner point, finding correspondence
is then equivalent to finding for each corner point in one set the corner point on the
other set that has the most similar shape context. The distance between two shape









where hp(i) and hq(i) denote the K-bin normalized shape context histogram at
points p and q, respectively. Given the shape context distance between all pairs
of corner points pi in the original image and corner points qj in the retargeted
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image, we need to find a one-to-one correspondence such that the total cost of
matching
∑
iC(pi, qπ(i)) is minimized. Here, π is a permutation representing the
one-to-one correspondence. In our current problem, we have aligned the corner
points between original image and retargeted image, therefore, we expect that for the
correct correspondence the distance between two matched points will be small. We
can introduce an additional term into the cost function so that C(p, q) = αCs(p, q)+
(1 − α)Cd(p, q), where Cs(p, q) is the shape context distance and Cd(p, q) is the
distance between the two points p and q. This optimal matching problem can be
solved using the Hungarian method [81] in O(N3) time.
The correspondence found using above method minimizes the shape context
difference and distance between matched corner points. However, there is no ex-
plicit cost term that minimizes the difference of displacements between neighboring
matched points. More specifically, if one corner point in the original image is shifted
to the left by 10 pixels, we would expect the neighboring corner points in the original
image are also shifted to the left by similar amounts. This is because the retargeting
operation typically tries to minimize the distortion when scaling down or removing
parts of the image. Therefore, to refine the matching results, we perform an ad-
ditional step of outlier removal. For each corner point pi in the original image,
we compute a displacement vector vi = qπ(i) − pi, which captures the displacement
of its corresponding point in the retargeted image. Then we compare vi with dis-
placement vectors {vj} of points {pj} that fall into close neighborhood of pi. If
the difference between vi and average of {vj} is larger than certain threshold, we
consider (pi, qπ(i)) a false match. An example of finding corresponding corner points
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are illustrated below. In Fig. 3.12, we show the original image and its retargeted
version. In Fig. 3.13, we show the matching results without and with outlier re-
moval. We can see that outlier removal helps us to obtain more accurate matching,
so that distortion evaluation can be more accurate.
(a) Original image (b) Retargeted image
Figure 3.12: Original image and its retargeted version. Images from RetargeMe
database [2]
Global distortion measure Given the correspondence between corner points
of original and retargeted images, we can measure the global structural distortion
due to the retargeting operation. Several distortion measures are considered in this
work. The first one is global affine cost. Since we know the positions of all the
corner points, we can use the correspondence to estimate a global affine transform
that transforms the set of corner points in the original image to the set of corner
points in the retargeted image. If we only consider scaling and rotation, the affine
transform matrix can be represented as a 2 by 2 matrix A. The singular value
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(a) Without outlier removal (b) With outlier removal
Figure 3.13: Correspondence between corner points in the original and retargeted
images
decomposition of the matrix A can be denoted as A = Oθ1DOθ2 , where D is a
diagonal matrix of singular values λ1 and λ2. The physical meaning of the singular
value decomposition is that the transform basically scales along the direction θ1 with
factor λ1 and scales along the orthogonal direction θ2 with factor λ2. If λ1 and λ2
are close to each other, the transformation roughly preserves the aspect ratio of the
image; if λ1 is much larger than λ2, then large distortion can be expected because
the aspect ratio of the image will be changed significantly. The global affine cost is
defined as
Cga = log(λ1/λ2). (3.5)
The second measure that we use here is called global bending energy. It
is computed from the transformation estimated using the thin plate spline (TPS)
model [25, 72]. Thin plate spline is a useful tool for interpolating surfaces over
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scattered data. Therefore, it can be used to estimate transformation over the entire
image from a limited number of point correspondences. TPS model also includes
the affine model as a special case. Bookstein [10,11] showed that TPS model is very
effective to model biological shape changes as deformation. There, two thin plate
spline mappings [fx(x, y), fy(x, y)] are used, each mapping the x and y coordinates of
corresponding points, i.e., fx(x, y) = x
′ and fy(x, y) = y
′, where (x, y) and (x′, y′) are
matched points. Then the transformation f(x, y) = [fx(x, y), fy(x, y)] is estimated













The physical meaning of bending energy measures how twisted the estimated
surface is. In this work, we use Cgb as the global bending energy to measure global
structural distortion. A smaller distortion will generate smoother transformation
and thus smaller bending energy.
The third global distortion measure used here captures the amount of content
loss due to the retargeting operation. Since we only have partial information about
the original image, we measure the content loss by the number of corner points that





where No is the number of corner points in the original image and Nm is the number
of matching points established between the original and retargeted images. Since
stronger corner points tend to locate at salient objects or structures in the image, a
smaller content loss indicates a better retargeting quality.
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Local distortion analysis One of the advantages of reduced-reference quality
assessment is that we have partial information from the original image, which can
enable us to provide detailed analysis on quality degradation. In addition to the
global distortion scores mentioned earlier, in this part, we provide analysis on local
distortions caused by the retargeting operation.
The main idea of state-of-the-art retargeting operations is to resize different
parts of the image differently through scaling, warping, or carving. Salient objects
or regions will be scaled more uniformly so that the aspect ratio of the object is
preserved and minimum distortion is introduced. For less important regions, the re-
sizing operation will have less constraint because a large distortion can be tolerated.
Such a main spirit of retargeting motivates us to perform quality assessment in a
similar manner, i.e., to evaluate the distortions locally and differently for different
regions of the image. Salient regions will have higher penalty on large distortions
and non-salient areas will have smaller weight on their contribution to the overall
distortions. We perform a two-step evaluation of the local distortion in this manner.
In the first step, we perform spatial clustering on the matched corner points such
that within each cluster, the corners will be spatially close to each other and have
consistent displacement patterns. In the second step, we weigh the distortion of
each local cluster with their saliency to get a final quality score.
Spatial clustering, which group similar spatial objects into classes, is an im-
portant component of spatial data mining [42]. Spatial clustering techniques can be
classified into four categories: partitioning method, hierarchical method, density-
based method and grid-based method. A detailed survey of spatial clustering and
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their classification can be found in [43]. In this work, we use K-meloid clustering to
cluster corner points. K-meloid is similar to K-means clustering but instead of us-
ing average of cluster elements as centroid, K-meloid uses the most central element
in the cluster as centroid. This makes K-meloid clustering more robust to noise
and outlier data than the simple K-means clustering. We use an efficient K-meloid
clustering method called Clustering Large Application using RANdomized Search
(CLARANS) [75] for its efficiency and good quality of clustering. The basic idea
of CLARANS is to perform a randomized search of node with minimum cost in a
graph. The node here represents the selection of K meloids and the graph is com-
posed of such nodes and neighboring nodes different at only one of the K meloids.
The use of randomized search provides the advantage of efficient and the benefit of
not confining the search to only a localized area. Both K-mean and K-meloid are
partition-based clustering, therefore, they have the limitation of requiring specifying
the number of clusters K at the beginning. To alleviate such a constraint, we take
the following approach: we select a relatively large K to start with, and then merge
neighboring clusters if their displacement vectors are very similar, and split a cluster
if the displacement vectors within are diverse. An example of the spatial cluster-
ing is shown below, where Fig. 3.14 shows the original and retargeted images and
Fig. 3.15 shows the corner point correspondence and their clustering result. Corner
points of different clusters are labeled with different colors.
Each cluster of corner points obtained from the above spatial clustering method
will have consistent displacement vectors, and thus they are expected to cover certain
objects inside the image that have undergone resizing. In this work, we further
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(a) Original image (b) Retargeted image
Figure 3.14: Original image and its retargeted version.
utilize the image saliency information so that different regions/objects of the image
contribute differently to the final quality score. Saliency is a subjective measure
that captures what human observers consider as important in an image. Measuring
saliency is an important step in image retargeting and different saliency metrics have
been used in the literature, such as gradient magnitudes [118] and discontinuity of
neighbors if a pixel is removed [90]. In this work, we use the saliency measure
proposed by [110], which combines the gradient magnitude and the saliency map by
Itti et al. [45]. The gradient information captures structural areas and the saliency
map by Itti et al. captures attractive areas that have different color, intensity and
orientation properties than their surroundings. The final saliency image is evaluated
as W = Wα×Wβ, where Wα = (( ∂∂xI)
2 + ( ∂
∂y
I)2)0.5, and Wβ is the saliency map by
Itti et al. An example of the saliency evaluation is shown in Fig. 3.16.
The clusters of corner points indicate how different parts of the image have
been transformed during the retargeting operation. The saliency map tells us how
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(a) Corner point correspondence (b) Spatial clustering result
Figure 3.15: Corner point correspondence and spatial clustering result
important different areas of the image are. Combining the two, we can compute
some quality score that measures local distortion of retargeting in terms of whether
each region is resized uniformly and how different neighboring regions have been
resized. Denote the set of corner point clusters as C1, · · · , Ck. For each Ci, we
select l neighbor clusters Ci1, · · · , Cil that are within certain distance threshold
to the current cluster. The distortion contributed by two neighboring clusters is
computed as
dij(Ci, Cij) = ‖vi − vij‖ · dse−α·de . (3.8)
Here vi and vij are the displacement vectors of the meloids in cluster Ci and Cij,




how likely the two clusters cover the same object. Si and Sj are the saliency values
of regions covered by Ci and Cij, respectively and Sij is the saliency of regions
between Ci and Cij. If two regions of high saliency are connected also by regions
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(a) Original image (b) Gradient magnitude
(c) Saliency map by Itti et al. [45] (d) Final saliency map
Figure 3.16: Saliency map of an image
of high saliency, these two regions are likely to cover the same object. If they are
connected by regions of low saliency, they may cover different objects therefore the
weight assigned to the discrepancy between their displacement vectors will be lower.







In summary, we have defined three quality metrics, namely global affine cost
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Cga in equation 3.5, global bending energy Cgb in equation 3.6, content loss Ccl
in equation 3.7 and cluster inconsistency Cci in equation 3.9. In the next section,
we provide experimental results on using these quality scores on images undergone
different retargeting algorithms.
3.2.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we present some experimental results on using corner points as
partial information for reduced-reference quality assessment on images retargeted
by different algorithms.
Experimental setup The retargeted image database that we used here is from
the RetargetMe project [2], which contains 80 color images, each of which is re-
targeted by 8 different retargeting algorithms. The compared retargeting methods
are: nonhomogeneous warping (WARP) [118], Seam carving (SC) [90], Scale-and-
Stretch (SNS) [110], Multi-operator (MULTIOP) [91], Shift-maps (SM) [85], Stream-
ing Video (SV) [54], and Energy-based deformation (LG) [50]. More details can be
found in [89]. In addition to providing the images undergone different retargeting
algorithms, the RetargetMe project has carried out an extensive subjective eval-
uation on the retargeted images by involving human observers through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk service. In the last part of this section, we measure how well our
proposed quality metrics correlate with users’ subjective ratings.
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Distortion analysis using partial information In this part, we demonstrate
how the proposed quality scores correlate with human observation through several
examples. In Fig. 3.17, we show the original image, the images retargeted by simple
cropping and scaling (CR), seam-carving (SC), and streaming video (SV). We choose
these three retargeting methods to compare here because they capture the three
major types of retargeting effects. Cropping and scaling retains the aspect ratio of
salient objects, and is found to be preferred by many human observers, especially
when the original image is not available for comparison [89]. Seam carving resizes
an image by removing seams of low energy. This will often change the aspect ratio
of salient objects when the resizing factor is large. Streaming video represents the
state-of-the-art retargeting that tries to scale different parts of the image different
so that edge discontinuity as observed in seam carving can be reduced.
In Fig. 3.18, we show the point correspondence between the retargeted images
and the original image. The correspondences here clearly demonstrate the different
types of retargeting effect. For the image undergone cropping, we can see that the
matched corner points have no displacement. For seam carving, we can see that
the displacement of corners is mostly horizontal which means vertical seams have
been removed from the image. Also, different regions have different displacement
sizes, which indicates the different amount of carving at different regions. For image
undergone streaming video, we can see the retargeting has a scaling effect, which
scales down the salient region, i.e., the ship, quite uniformly so that we do not see
the kind of structure distortion as we can see in the seam carved image.
The quality scores computed on these retargeted images is shown in Table 3.4.
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We can see that cropping causes the least amount of affine cost and bending energy.
This is expected because no structural distortion is introduced from the cropping
operation. Seam carving has the highest affine cost, bending energy and cluster
inconsistency, because the structural change caused by SC cannot be modelled well
by affine. Streaming video achieves much lower Cga, Cgb and Cci because the struc-
tural change introduced by SV is smooth and can be well modelled by an affine
transform. In this example, there is no corner points outside the ship, so cropping
has no content loss. But in general, we will expect cropping to have larger amount
of content loss than other methods. Overall, we can see that the proposed metrics
correlate well with subjective expectations on this example.
Table 3.4: Quality scores on images retargeted by CR, SC, and SV methods
Quality metric CR SC SV
Global affine cost Cga 5.6× 10−4 0.32 0.09
Global bending energy Cgb 1.6× 10−3 7.34 0.62
Content loss Ccl 0% 2.5% 3.3%
Cluster inconsistency Cci 0.04 0.14 0.05
Such a displacement field estimated from the corresponding corner points be-
tween the retargeted image and the original image not only can be used to compute
several scores for automatic quality evaluation, but more importantly, it provides an
important tool to assist human evaluation when the original image is not available.
In such cases, the compact side information of the corner points actually provides
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very rich information on how the image has been retargeted. Since different persons
will have different preference on various kinds of distortions, such as edge discon-
tinuity, violated symmetry, content loss, etc., such an objective displacement map
allows users to make their own judgement and preferences instead of being forced
to accept a single quality score computed for them. This can be considered as one
important advantage of the reduced-reference quality evaluation algorithm proposed
in this work.
Correlation of objective quality score with subjective ratings We also
compute the correlation of the objective quality score with subjective user ratings
collected in [89]. For every pair of the eight retargeting methods compared in [89], a
human observer is presented with two images retargeted using the two methods and
asked about his/her preference in terms of which of the two images looks better.
There are two scenarios: in the first one the user is given only the retargeted images
and in the second scenario, the user is also given the original image as reference.
Such experiment is repeated on 210 participants and leads to the collective subjec-
tive rating for each of the retargeting methods. In [89], the authors compute the
correlation between the objective quality score with the subjective rating by ranking
the eight retargeting methods and then computes the Kendall-τ correlation between







where nc is the number of concordant pairs and nd is the number of discordant pairs
over all pairs of entries in the two rankings. τ will have values between [−1, 1],
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where a value of 1 indicates highest correlation or perfect agreement while a value
of -1 is the case of perfect disagreement. Furthermore, to test the significance of the
correlation values, a χ2 hypothesis test is carried out against the null hypothesis that
the observed correlations are zero mean, which means the subjective and objective
scores are uncorrelated.
Below, we compute the Kendall-τ correlation scores and the p-values for the
proposed quality metrics, as well as for some metrics in [89]. In Table 3.5, we show
the results of correlation against the subjective ratings when users are not given the
reference image, and Table 3.6 shows the results for the scenario of with the reference
image. Bidirectional Similarity (BDS) is an image similarity measure proposed
by [99]. For each patch in one image, a well-matched patch is sought in the other
image and the distance of two images is defined as the mean distance in color space
between corresponding patches. Bidirectional warping (BDW) is a similar metric
with the exception that the mapping between the two images is constrained to be
one-way. It is used in [91] as a similarity metric to optimize the retargeting process.
The Earth Mover’s Distance [82] measuring the similarity of two distributions by
computing the minimum cost required to transform one distribution into the other.
It should be noted that these three metrics all require the original image to be
available and thus fall into the scenario of full-reference quality assessment.
From these two tables, we can see that the full-reference metric EMD performs
the best among all metrics and the positive correlation is statistically significant (p-
value ¡ 0.05). The proposed metric cluster inconsistency Cci has positive correlation
with subjective ratings and its performance comes close to BDS in the scenario
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Table 3.5: Correlation with subjective evaluation without reference
Quality metric Mean std p-value
BDS 0.12 0.28 0.0067
BDW 0.068 0.29 0.085
EMD 0.238 0.24 1e-6
Global affine cost Cga 0.052 0.25 0.11
Global bending energy Cgb 0.031 0.26 0.24
Content loss Ccl 0.081 0.25 0.03
Cluster inconsistency Cci 0.11 0.32 0.018
without reference and close to BDW in the scenario with reference. The proposed
metric content loss Ccl also has positive correlations in both scenarios, and it is
interesting to notice that in the scenario of with reference, the correlation of Ccl
significantly higher than the without reference case, which indicates that when the
user sees the original image, they may give loss of content a higher weight in the
subjective quality evaluation process. The other two metrics global affine cost and
global bending energy do not have significant correlation with the subjective ratings.
Overall, we see that even the highest correlation by EMD is not very high, which
indicates that it is very challenging to design a quality metric that can correlate
well with human subjectives. Similar results are also demonstrated in [89], where it
is shown that even humans tend to disagree with each other on quality assessment
of retargeted images.
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Table 3.6: Correlation with subjective evaluation with reference
Quality metric Mean std p-value
BDS 0.06 0.30 0.11
BDW 0.10 0.32 0.026
EMD 0.25 0.28 1e-6
Global affine cost Cga 0.07 0.25 0.052
Global bending energy Cgb 0.03 0.29 0.28
Content loss Ccl 0.16 0.25 0.0003
Cluster inconsistency Cci 0.12 0.28 0.0081
Nevertheless, we want to stress that the quality scores proposed in this work
only uses very compact partial information from the original image. They cannot
achieve the best performance of a full-reference quality metric (EMD), but still
shows good correlation with users’ subjective ratings and have performance similar
to some of the full-reference quality metrics (BDS, BDW). More importantly, as
we showed earlier in this section, the proposed quality evaluation algorithm does
not only give a single quality score, but also provides detailed distortion map that




In this chapter, we first studied the problem of estimating seam carving using
forensic hash. The adaptive nature of seam carving allows effective image tampering
against traditional blind forensic techniques. However, we demonstrate that using
the forensic hash proposed in Section 2.3.2 without changing its design, we can reli-
ably estimate both the amount and the location of seam carving, and further enable
accurate alignment and tampering localization on a modified image. Such detailed
information of trustworthiness provided by the forensic hash is important for better
utilization of online multimedia information. In the second part of this chapter, we
further extended the FASHION spirit to evaluate quality of images that have under-
gone more general image retargeting operations. Given the increasing popularity of
mobile devices and media consumption on different screen sizes, ensuring and moni-
toring quality of retargeted image can find important applications. We proposed to
compactly encode corner points as partial information and compute correspondence
of corner points to estimate a detailed distortion map due to the retargeting oper-
ation. Quality metrics that capture the global and local structure distortions are
proposed. Experiment results show that some of the proposed metrics (content loss
and cluster indistinguishability) have statistically significant correlation with human
subjective evaluations. Furthermore, the distortion map provides an important tool
to assist users in evaluating image quality with their own preferences instead of
being forced to accept a single quality score.
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(a) Original image (b) Image resized by cropping and scaling
(c) Image resized by seam carving (d) Image resized by streaming video
Figure 3.17: Original image and its retargeted versions
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(a) Correspondence of image retargeted by CR (b) Correspondence of image retargeted by SC
(c) Correspondence of image retargeted by SV
Figure 3.18: Correspondence between retargeted images and original image
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CHAPTER 4
Confidentiality-Preserving Search of Multimedia
4.1 Introduction
The advancement of information technology has been rapidly integrating the
physical world where we live and the online world that we rely on for retrieving,
sharing, and managing information. Online services and web applications emerge
everyday and benefit our life in almost every aspect: from information retrieval us-
ing search engines to sharing user generated content through social networks, and
from personal information management, such as webmail and online photo albums,
to online backup services. With the arrival of the cloud computing paradigm, the
Internet stores not only information for sharing, but also sensitive personal data
that should be carefully protected against any unauthorized access. Secure manage-
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ment of personal data stored online is an increasingly important issue that can help
achieve the data confidentiality and availability requirements of cloud computing.
Technologies that can enable secure online data management are going to play a
critical role in the future of the internet.
Traditional privacy protection for online personal data focuses on access con-
trol and secure data transmission, which ensure that the data can be securely trans-
mitted to the server and no unauthorized people can access the data. However,
once the data arrives at the server, the server decrypts the data and operates on
plaintext in order to provide services to users, such as categorization, search, and
data analysis. This makes the user’s private information vulnerable to untrustwor-
thy service providers and malicious intruders. For example, most personal emails
are stored online as plaintext data and can be viewed by the system administrator.
Given the trend that an increasing amount of personal data will be stored at a
third-party server, it is both desirable and necessary to develop technologies that
can better protect users’ privacy without sacrificing the usability and accessibility
of the information.
Information retrieval over encrypted databases is a promising technological
capability for privacy protection in online information management. Encryption of
the data stored on the server helps protect content privacy against untrustworthy
service providers and malicious intruders, but using traditional cryptographic ci-
phers alone makes it difficult for the server to process the data, and for the user to
retrieve information from the encrypted database. The goal of information retrieval
over an encrypted database is to provide efficient and accurate search capability
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over encrypted documents without decrypting them first. An example application
is that a user stores his/her private data in encrypted form on web servers and
later wants to search and retrieve data in a privacy preserving manner. The server
here merely provides the storage and search capability, and should not be able to
decrypt the private data. For privacy protection, the amount of information that
the server can learn from the user’s data set should be kept minimal. Due to the
widespread use of digital cameras and portable camcorders, multimedia data has
become a significant part of today’s personal data collections. Storing and manag-
ing this large volume of multimedia data online is a desirable option for convenient
data access anywhere anytime. Technologies that can enable content-based retrieval
over encrypted multimedia databases will play an important role in helping people
manage their multimedia data both effectively and securely. The main focus of the
current work is to explore efficient techniques for such an application.
Related Work
Prior work in the area of information retrieval in the encrypted domain focused
on text documents. Song et al. [102], Brinkman et al. [14], and Boneh et al. [9]
explored Boolean search to identify whether a query term is present in an encrypted
text document. Swaminathan et al. [104] proposed a framework for rank-ordered
search over encrypted text documents, so that documents can be returned in the
order of their relevance to the query term. In that work, several protocols are studied
to address different operational constraints such as different communication cost
allowed to perform the secure search. Secure text retrieval techniques can also be
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applied to keyword based search of multimedia data. However, keyword search relies
on having accurate text description of the content already available, and its search
scope is confined to the existing keyword set. In contrast, content-based search over
an encrypted multimedia database provides more flexibility, whereby sample images,
audios or videos are presented as queries and documents with similar audio-visual
content in the database are identified.
An emerging area of work related to confidentiality preserving multimedia re-
trieval is secure signal processing, which aims at performing signal processing tasks
while keeping the signals being processed secret. Erkin et al. [29] provided a review
of related cryptographic primitives and some applications of secure signal processing
in data analysis and content protection. However, applying cryptographic primitives
to content-based multimedia retrieval is not straightforward. Effective multimedia
retrieval typically relies on evaluating the similarity of two documents using the dis-
tance between their visual features, such as color histograms, shape descriptors, or
salient points [23]. By design, traditional cryptographic primitives do not preserve
the distance between feature vectors after encryption. Given the much larger data
volume for multimedia data than that of text and other generic data, efficiency and
scalability are also critical for multimedia retrieval but can be difficult to achieve us-
ing cryptographic primitives alone. Another work by Shashank et al. [98] addresses
the problem of protecting the privacy of the query image when searching over a
public database, where the images in the database are not encrypted. By appropri-
ately formulating the query message and response message during multiple rounds
of communication between the user and the server, the server is made oblivious to
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the actual search path and thus unaware of the query content.
Recent work in the area of secure computation for privacy protection addressed
related but different problems under various application settings [28, 47, 79, 92, 119,
121]. Yiu et al. [121] considered privacy preserving range query over geospatial co-
ordinates using a k-dimensional tree. Extending such a technique to multimedia
retrieval is difficult because features used for content-based multimedia retrieval are
high dimensional vectors and kd-tree is known to be inefficient in high dimensional
spaces. Wong et al. [119] proposed secure k-NN computation that can determine
which of two encrypted database entries has a smaller distance to the query, while
keeping the actual distance value secret. This work can potentially be used for
rank-ordered multimedia retrieval, but the efficiency is limited because each com-
parison only answers a binary question of which one among the two being larger or
smaller. Erkin et al. [28], Sadeghi et al. [92] and Osadchy et al. [79] studied privacy
preserving face recognition, where one party wants to verify the existence of a given
face image in a database hosted on another party’s servers. The two parties want
to keep their own data secret from each other. Additive homomorphic encryption
schemes are used to allow similarity computation in the encrypted domain. Similar
techniques are also used by Jiang et al. [47] to identify the existence of similar text
documents between two parties. As there have been no efficient homomorphic en-
cryption schemes yet that allow both addition and multiplication, multiple rounds
of communication between the two parties are required to compute the Euclidean
distance between the query and each database entry.
There are several major differences between our current work and the above
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mentioned works [28, 47, 79, 92]: (1) we are considering rank-ordered search where
the server needs to return the documents ranked according to their similar to the
query, while existing secure computing work typically focus on a binary matching
problem, such as biometric matching and keyword search, and the server may be
made oblivious to the binary matching result; (2) in our secure search problem, the
user owns all the data and the server merely offers storage and search functional-
ity, while in secure multi-party computation scenario, both parties have their own
private data that need to be kept secret from each other when computing a joint
function; (3) we consider retrieval over large volumes of multimedia data using high
dimensional visual features, which requires efficient processing to be practical; (4)
existing work typically exploit homomorphic encryption and cryptographic protocols
that involve high computation and communication cost, which can be formidably ex-
pensive for content-based retrieval over a large multimedia database, while our work
seeks highly practical and efficient schemes without incurring heavy communication.
(5) The application considered in this work is more consumer-oriented, which has
less stringent requirement on security but demands highly efficient solutions and
least user involvement; while the applications considered in secure computation lit-
erature typically involve very sensitive data such as biometrics, thus demanding very
high security at the cost of heavier computation and communication cost.
Contributions and Chapter Organization
Given the different application settings and different requirements on security-
efficiency trade-off, it is not feasible to employ techniques such as homomorphic
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encryption and cryptography protocols, which are arguably too heavy-weight for
consumer applications. As such, we are trying to approach the problem from a
practical perspective and explore what we can do now as possible solutions to help
protect confidentiality of online personal data. By jointly exploiting areas of cryp-
tography, image processing, and information retrieval, we propose efficient confiden-
tiality preserving search techniques [66], without multiple rounds of communications
between the user and the server. The search capability over encrypted multimedia
database is achieved by designing proper scrambling or randomization schemes for
visual features and search indexes generated from the multimedia data, while the
multimedia data can be encrypted by any established cryptographic ciphers. We
propose two types of confidentiality preserving search techniques: the first group
of techniques focuses on visual feature protection that allows similarity comparison
among scrambled features; while the second group of techniques aim at randomizing
the search indexes directly, where the search indexes are typically generated from
visual features and carefully designed to enable efficient search over large multi-
media databases. The two groups of techniques are complementary and represent
different trade-offs between user-side computational complexity and communication
overhead.
We demonstrate the proposed techniques using image databases in this work,
although these techniques are applicable to other multimedia modalities such as
video. Our experiments show that privacy preserving retrieval can achieve com-
parable performance as traditional plaintext retrieval. The proposed schemes also
demonstrate good efficiency and reveal as little information as possible to an hon-
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est but curious server. It should be noted that we are not designing highly secure
encryption schemes, but we are exploring, from an interdisciplinary point of view,
efficient algorithms that can be practical and offer certain amount of randomiza-
tion to preserve data confidentiality. We also provide quantitative study on such
a security-efficiency trade-off. Since a user’s private photo collection may not be
as sensitive as his/her biometric data, a highly efficient scheme with reduced secu-
rity provides a reasonable practical solution for applications that do not require the
highest level of protection or cannot afford the computation and communication cost
required by traditional cryptographic schemes. To the best of our knowledge, this
work is among the first endeavors on confidentiality-preserving content-based mul-
timedia retrieval and can have promising applications in secure online multimedia
management.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 formulates the problem of
confidentiality preserving multimedia search and discuss possible solutions. Sections
4.3 and 4.4 presents the proposed search schemes, based on feature protection and
index randomization, respectively. Section 4.5 summarizes experimental results on
retrieval over an encrypted color image database. Summary of the chapter is given
in Section 4.6.
4.2 Problem Formulation
We now use image as an example modality to discuss problem formulation. In
order to protect data privacy, images need to be encrypted before being transferred
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to the remote server. Image encryption can be done using state-of-the-art ciphers
such as AES or RSA by treating images as ordinary data, or using image specific en-
cryption techniques such as selective and format-compliant encryption [71], [41], [52]
to enable post-processing such as transcoding of encrypted images. As these tech-
niques are built upon established cryptographic encryption tools, it is computation-
ally difficult for an adversary to decrypt the encrypted image files.
In modern image retrieval techniques, content similarity is typically evaluated
using search indexes or visual features, such as color histograms and salient points,
instead of comparing images pixel by pixel. Therefore, encryption of images alone
is not sufficient for privacy preserving retrieval because search indexes or image
features in plaintext may reveal information about image content. For example,
a color histogram with large values for the blue components would indicate the
presence of sky or ocean, and SIFT descriptors [61] may reveal information about
distinctive objects in the image. In order to be able to search through the encrypted
database without leaking information from the plaintext search indexes or image
features, we devise schemes to generate and appropriately randomize image features
or indexes on the user side using a secret key and then transfer them to the server,
where the randomized features or indexes are used to evaluate image similarity
by the server. A system model for the secure search scenario is shown in Figure
4.1, where the left part depicts the database construction stage and the right part
depicts the retrieval stage. There are two entities in this model: a user who owns the
private image collections, and a server who stores the encrypted data and performs
retrieval based on a given encrypted query. During database construction, the user
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encrypts the images using standard ciphers and protects visual features or search
indexes using the schemes proposed in this work. After encryption, the user sends
the encrypted data to the server for storage. During retrieval, the user randomizes
the visual feature or search index from the query image and sends the randomized
index to the server, who performs retrieval using the randomized index to return
similar images in their encrypted form. The block “Build search index” corresponds
to randomizing the features in the feature protection schemes or building secure
indexes in the secure indexing schemes, which is the focus of this work and will be
described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Figure 4.1: System model for secure image retrieval
The first approach for secure image retrieval is to randomize the feature vec-
tors of each image and store those randomized features on the server, as described
in Section 4.3. The server can use these randomized features as näıve indexes if
the database is small, or the server can build efficient indexes upon the random-
ized features for improved search efficiency. Since the similarity of two images
is typically measured by computing the distance between features extracted from
them [23], the randomization of image features should approximately preserve their
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distances. Suppose we represent image features as vectors in Rn, we seek a ran-
domization function E(·) : Rn → Rm, such that given two feature vectors f and g,
dE(E(f), E(g)) ≈ c · d(f ,g), where dE(·, ·) and d(·, ·) are some appropriate distance
measures on the randomized and the raw features, respectively, and c is a con-
stant scaling factor. The approximate distance preserving randomization scrambles
the visual features for content protection and allows servers to perform similarity
comparison in the encrypted domain.
Since efficiency and scalability are critical aspects for retrieval from a large
database and rely on the design of search indexes, the second approach for secure
image retrieval explores the possibility of randomizing the state-of-the-art multime-
dia search indexes without affecting their search capability. During retrieval, the
content owner who knows the secret key can generate a properly randomized query
index from the query image. The server then compares the randomized query index
with the stored indexes and returns the encrypted files of the most similar images
to the user for decryption and viewing. Without knowing the secret key used for
randomization, it should be difficult to search the database or infer the database
content. The randomized index also helps protect the privacy of the query image.
Secure image retrieval through feature and index randomization are closely re-
lated. Image features themselves can be considered as a special form of search index,
where each image is represented by its feature vectors and the query image’s feature
is compared to all features in the database. On the other hand, modern indexing
schemes are built upon image features and allow efficient retrieval by reducing the
number of images that need to be compared. Since the randomized features preserve
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the capability of similarity comparison, they can be used to build efficient indexing
schemes. The content owner has the flexibility either to provide the server with ran-
domized features and let the server perform the time-consuming index generation,
or to generate the secure index on his/her side to reduce the amount of information
that needs to be sent to the server. Therefore, the two kinds of approaches represent
different trade-offs between user-side computational complexity and communication
overhead.
4.3 Visual Feature Protection
In this section, we propose two categories of secure retrieval schemes. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, most state-of-the-art content-based image retrieval
techniques utilize low-level visual features to represent and compare image content,
and these visual features can potentially reveal important information about the
image content. We first discuss feature protection schemes that enable similarity
comparison between features in the encrypted domain. The randomized features
along with encrypted images can protect image content privacy against untrustwor-
thy service providers and malicious intruders.
The ability to generate randomized indexes on the user side provides an alter-
native for secure retrieval with reduced communication overhead. In the second part
of this section, we discuss the protection of search indexes by exploiting the visual
words representation of images [77]. Visual words method hierarchically clusters
features into a vocabulary tree, following which each image is indexed based on this
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vocabulary tree and represented as a bag of visual words. Experiments on object
recognition in the recent literature [77, 83] show that visual words based represen-
tation can be scaled to large databases. We propose two secure indexing schemes
based on inverted index [122] and min-hash [16]. These two schemes protect infor-
mation about the image content from the adversary and at the same time achieve
efficient and scalable search capability.
Three feature protection schemes are proposed in this work with different
trade-offs among computational complexity, retrieval performance, and security.
4.3.1 Bitplane Randomization
The most significant bits (MSB) of an image capture important information
about image appearance. The concept of processing bit-planes from MSBs to LSBs
has been used in multimedia signal processing such as scalable encoding to provide
fine granular trade-off between bit-rate and quality. Feature vectors with small
distances are likely to have similar patterns among their MSB bit-planes. This
motivates us to investigate the scrambling of feature vectors based on a secret key,
such that the patterns in the MSB bit-planes of the feature vectors are preserved for
similarity comparison, but without knowing the secret key, the bit-planes cannot be
decrypted to reveal the image content.
Given a feature vector f = [f1, · · · , fn] ∈ Rn, each component fi is represented
in its binary form as [bi1, · · · , bil]T , where bi1 is the first MSB, bil is the least signifi-
cant bit (LSB) or the lth MSB, and l is the total number of bit-planes. For example,
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Permutation
πj(1, 2, · · · , n)
XOR
[r1j , r2j , · · · , rnj ]
[b1j , b2j , · · · , bnj ] [b̃1j , b̃2j , · · · , b̃nj ]
Figure 4.2: Randomization of the jth bit-plane
the 8-bit representation of “148” is 10010100, so the 1st MSB to the 8th MSB of
148 are 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, respectively, and the LSB is 0. The jth bit-plane of f is
composed of the jth MSB of the n feature components, denoted as [b1j, b2j, · · · , bnj].
The Hamming distance between two bit-planes is preserved when each bit-plane is
XORed with the same binary vector or when each is permuted using the same per-
mutation pattern. We exploit this property to randomize the top k MSB bit-planes
of the feature vectors while preserving the Hamming distances among randomized
bit-planes.
The randomization of the jth bit-plane of a given feature vector is illustrated
in Fig. 4.2. The bits comprising the bit-plane are first XORed with a pseudoran-
dom binary sequence, which essentially randomly flips the value of each bit. As a
result, each bit in the resulting bit-plane will be equally likely to be 0 or 1 and the
number of ‘1’s in the bit-plane will be approximately the same as the number of
‘0’s. Hiding the original number of ‘1’s in each bit-plane maximizes the entropy of
the randomized bit-planes and thus improves security. The resulting bits are then
randomly permuted to obtain the randomized bit-plane.
All the randomized bit-planes are reassembled to form the randomized feature
vector E(f) = [f̃1, · · · , f̃n]. Since the values {f̃1, · · · , f̃n} are completely random,
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traditional L1 or L2 norm does not capture the similarity between randomized fea-
tures. Instead, we compute the distance between two randomized feature vectors









ij | × w(j). (4.1)
Here, b̃ij is the i
th bit in the jth randomized bit-plane, and w(j)s are the weights
assigned to the bit-planes to reflect their unequal importance, which are chosen
to be 2−j in this work. Since using the same permutation and XOR pattern on




















∣∣∣∣∣ = ‖f − g‖1.
(4.2)
The distance dE(·, ·) between randomized features is an upper bound on the
L1 distance between the original features. The bound is mostly tight but occa-
sionally large errors between dE(E(f), E(g)) and ‖f − g‖1 may arise as some feature
vectors with small L1 distance may have large distance under dE(·, ·). For example,
8 = (1000)2 and 7 = (0111)2 have L1 distance 1 but dE(8, 7) = 15. Fortunately, such
cases occur with a relatively low probability, and experimental results in Section 4.5
show that bit-plane randomization leads to only a slight reduction in retrieval ac-
curacy, as a trade-off for security.
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4.3.2 Random Projection
An alternative to treating the feature vector as separate bit-planes is to con-
sider the vector as a whole and perform some random transformation that preserves
the distance. Random projection accomplishes this goal based on the idea that
close points in a high dimensional space will be mapped to close points in a low
dimensional space with high probability. Due to this property, random projection
has been used as a building block in locality sensitive hashing [39] for efficient search
over large multimedia databases.
The idea of random projection is briefly described as follows. Given a feature
vector f ∈ Rn, we generate a key-dependent Gaussian random matrix R ∈ Rm×n
with independent standard Gaussian components. The randomized function is de-
fined as
E(f) = R · f = [r1 · f , · · · , rm · f ] ∈ Rm, (4.3)
where ri ·f is the dot product between the ith row of R and f . The distance preserv-
ing property of random projection can be derived by considering the L1 distance of





|ri · f − ri · g| =
m∑
i=1
|ri · (f − g)| =
m∑
i=1
‖ri‖2 · ‖f − g‖2 · | cos(θi)|
= ‖f − g‖2 ·
m∑
i=1
‖ri‖2 · | cos(θi)| ≈ c · ‖f − g‖2
(4.4)
Here, θi is an independent and identically distributed random variable representing
the angle between the vector f − g and the random vector ri. By the law of large
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numbers, ‖ri‖2 ≈ const and
∑m
i=1|cos(θi)| ≈ const. Thus, the distance dE(·, ·)
between randomized features is proportional to the L2 distance between the original
feature vectors with high probability. By increasing the dimensionm of the projected
feature vector, the error |dE(E(f), E(g)) − c · ‖f − g‖2| can be made arbitrarily
small, leading to better approximation of the original L2 distance. The projection
dimension m controls the trade-off between retrieval performance and storage, as
will be shown by the experimental results in Section 4.5.
In image retrieval literature, L1 norm is also widely used and is shown to
achieve slightly superior performance over L2 norm in retrieval based on color his-
togram [39]. Random projection can also be used to preserve the L1 distance between
the original feature vectors when the projection is performed on the square-root of
the feature vector,











To prove that the randomization in (4.5) preserves L1 distance, we introduce the
concept of unary encoding of an integer vector. Given f = [f1, · · · , fn], its unary
encoding U(f) is defined as follows:
U(f) = [U(f1),U(f2), · · · ,U(fn)], where U(fi) = 11 · · · 11︸ ︷︷ ︸
fi
00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−fi
. (4.6)
Here M is the maximum possible value for any component of f . Since the L1 and
L2 norms for a binary vector are the same, we can perform random projection on
U(f) so that
‖R · U(f)−R · U(g)‖1 ≈ c · ‖U(f)− U(g)‖2 = c · ‖f − g‖1. (4.7)
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Note that the projection of U(f) onto a vector of standard Gaussian random variables
results in a Gaussian random variable with variance
∑m
i=1 fi. This is equivalent to
the projection of
√
f onto a vector of standard Gaussian random variables.
The security of random projection based scheme is due to the fact that without
knowing the secret key and therefore the projection matrix R, it is extremely difficult
to reconstruct the exact original features from the projected ones. For m < n,
y = R · x ∈ Rm is an under-determined equation and there are infinitely many x
that can give the same output y. For m ≥ n, the equation y = R·x can be solved by
using pseudo-inverse, but a different choice of R will give a different x. Therefore,
without knowing R, it is extremely difficult to obtain the exact x by knowing y.
4.3.3 Randomized Unary Encoding
Key-dependent random projection is an efficient algorithm for feature pro-
tection and preserves the distance between feature vectors with high probability.
However, since the projection is a linear operation, using a reasonable amount of
known plaintext features and their randomized versions, an attacker can obtain the
projection matrix. As will be shown by the security analysis in the next chapter,
this poses security threats in the known plaintext attack model (KPA), where the
attacker has access to a set of plaintext and ciphertext pairs. This motivates us
to add an additional layer of security by introducing non-linear operations into the
feature randomization.
Given a feature vector f = [f1, · · · , fn], we perform unary encoding U(f) =
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[U(f1),U(f2), · · · ,U(fn)]. The non-linearity of the randomization is achieved by per-
forming XOR of U(f) with a vector of binary random variables r and then randomly
permuting the resulting binary vector. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, XOR and ran-
dom permutation preserve the Hamming distance among U(f),∀f , which also equals
the L1 distance between original feature vectors. Denoting the randomization by
XOR and permutation as E1(·), we have ‖E1(U(f))−E1(U(g))‖2 = ‖f − g‖1. By us-
ing efficient shuffling algorithms, E1(·) takes O(nM) time, where M is the maximum
possible value for any component of f . One disadvantage of using unary encoding
is the storage increase from O(n logM) bits to O(nM) bits. To reduce storage, we
further apply random projection on E1(U(f)), which also plays an important role in
enhancing the security of the scheme, as will be shown in Section 4.5.
Denote the randomization by XOR and permutation as E1(·) and random
projection as E2(·). The overall randomization function E(·) is now E1(·) followed
by E2(·), and can be written as E(f) = E2(E1(U(f))) ∈ Rm. Considering L1 distance
of randomized features, we have the approximate distance preserving property
dE(E(f), E(g)) ≈ c · ‖E1(U(f))− E1(U(g))‖2 = c · ‖f − g‖1. (4.8)
The randomized unary encoding scheme effectively preserves the L1 distance of
original feature vectors with high probability and provides enhanced security, as
will be shown in Chapter 5.
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4.4 Secure Search Indexes
Once the image features are randomized using the above methods, they can
be stored onto the server and provide search capability in the encrypted domain
without revealing information about the database content. However, since the image
features are usually high dimensional vectors, comparing every pair of such vectors is
computationally prohibitive for a large database. Modern image retrieval techniques
often achieve efficiency and scalability through well-designed search indexes. In the
following, we propose two secure indexing schemes, – secure inverted index and
secure min-hash, which can retain the efficient search capability of the plaintext
search indexes.
4.4.1 Secure Inverted Index
Inverted index [122] is a widely used indexing structure in text document
retrieval, where each keyword has an associated inverted index listing the documents
that contain this keyword and the number of occurrences of this word in each of these
documents. Only those documents that appear in the query word’s inverted index
need to be considered during retrieval. By utilizing the visual words representation
of images [77], inverted index can be constructed for image documents and facilitates
efficient search and retrieval over large image databases.
In order to protect the privacy of query image and minimize the amount of
database information leaked to the server during the search process, inverted indexes
should be generated and protected on the user side before being transferred to the
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server. In order to generate inverted index, a vocabulary tree is first created, where
each node in the tree denotes a representative feature vector and each leaf node
represents a visual word. Generating a vocabulary tree requires large set of training
images and computationally intensive hierarchical clustering. Therefore, we assume
that the vocabulary tree will be generated by the service provider, who usually
has large computational resources, and is then provided to each user. To build
secure search indexes from the vocabulary tree, the content owner extracts the
visual features from each image, assigns each feature to the closest visual word in
the vocabulary tree, and finally updates and randomizes the inverted indexes for
those visual words. This procedure of index generation is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Inverted index generation by con-
tent owner
Word ID i
Image ID I1 I2 · · · INi
Word frequency w1 w2 · · · wNi
Figure 4.4: Data structure of inverted index
Consider a total ofN visual words and supposeNi images contain the i
th visual
word. Figure 4.4 shows the content of the inverted index of the ith visual word, where
wj is the number of times the i
th word appears in image Ij. Given any query image Q
and database image D, their bags of visual words are denoted as {Q1, Q2, · · · , QN}
and {D1, D2, · · · , DN}, respectively. Here Qi and Di are the number of times the
ith word appears in the query and the database image, respectively. Normalization
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i=1Di for all database images. After
normalization, Qi and Di can take non-integer values and represent the relative
frequency of occurrence of the ith word. In the conventional non-secure setting,
{D1, D2, · · · , DN} is used to update the inverted indexes during index generation
and {Q1, Q2, · · · , QN} is used to search the database for similar images.
Randomization of Inverted Index: Given that the service provider typi-
cally creates and thus has the knowledge of the vocabulary tree, inverted indexes in
their plaintext form can potentially reveal information about the visual content of
the images. We protect the inverted index by first performing a random permuta-
tion τ(·) on the word IDs so that the ith word will now have an ID τ(i). Computing
random permutation takes O(N) time and needs to be done only once on the user
side. However, the server needs to guess the correct IDs from O(N !) possibilities,
which is computationally infeasible given the typically large value of N .
Scrambling word IDs alone is not secure, because the server can still use visual
word frequencies to identify the words that appear more frequently. An example
is given in Figure 4.5, showing the distribution of word frequencies for local color
histograms extracted from the Corel image dataset of 1000 images. This statistical
information can be exploited to identify many words and makes the random permu-
tation less secure. We apply order preserving encryption (OPE) [3] to alleviate this
problem. OPE has the property that for two values x and y, if x < y, after encryp-
tion E(·), the order relation is preserved so that E(x) < E(y). By applying OPE
on the word frequency values, we can make the distribution of encrypted frequency
values close to a uniform distribution in order to reduce the amount of information
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leaked to the server. At the same time, the preservation of the order information
ensures that image similarity can still be compared in the encrypted domain.
To perform order preserving encryption, we map each frequency value w to an
integer uniformly selected from an interval [lw, uw]. The length of each such interval
is chosen by the content owner to be proportional to the number of times that the
value w occurs in all inverted indexes. Note that inverted index of a particular
word only stores information about images that contain this word, therefore only
positive w will be considered. Intervals for different word frequency values are
non-overlapping and order preserving, i.e., for w < v, their corresponding intervals
[lw, uw] and [lv, uv] satisfy uw < lv, while for w = v, they will be mapped to two values
randomly chosen from the same interval [lw, uw]. These intervals form a partition of a
large overall interval, and we use [0,7800] as the overall interval in our experiments.
Figure 4.6 shows that after order preserving encryption, the distribution of word
frequency values is closer to a uniform distribution over the large overall interval.















Figure 4.5: Histogram of word frequen-
cies before OPE













Figure 4.6: Histogram of word frequen-
cies after OPE
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Retrieval using Randomized Index: After randomization, the visual
words representations of the query image and an image in the database are de-
noted by {E(Q1), · · · , E(QN)} and {E(D1), · · · , E(DN)}, respectively, where E(·)
represents the order preserving encryption. Since visual words that are common in
many images carry little discriminative information, we weigh the OPE encrypted
version of each frequency value E(Qi) and E(Di) by its inverse document frequency
(IDF) [93]. IDF is defined as IDF = log(M
Ni
), where M is the total number of images
in the database and Ni is the number of images containing the word i. Commonly
occurring visual words will have low IDF and receive small weights in similarity
comparison. After encryption and weighting, we represent the query image and
database image as












The similarity of two images QOPE and DOPE after OPE is measured by the Jaccard









The Jaccard similarity measures the similarity between two sets and has been used
for near duplicate detection of text and image documents [15,20]. The set operations
∩ and ∪ are extended in Equation (11) to measure the similarity between two sets of
word frequency values. The functions min(·, ·) and max(·, ·) return the minimum and
maximum value of the two input arguments, respectively. As the order information
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used in min(·, ·) and max(·, ·) is preserved by the order preserving encryption, the
Jaccard similarity computed from the encrypted sets reflects the similarity of the
plaintext sets, thus allowing similarity comparison in the encrypted domain.
As order preserving encryption preserves the order among encrypted word
frequency values, some information about the randomized index may be revealed.
The other limitation of using OPE on the inverted index is that the length of intervals
used in OPE is determined by the distribution of word frequency values and this
distribution can change when many more images are added to or deleted from the
database. For example, if one word frequency value appears much more often in
the newly added set of images, the corresponding OPE interval will have higher
probability in the word frequency distribution than other intervals. Such a change
in the distribution may reveal some of the interval ranges used in OPE and make
OPE less secure. As the storage size of image indexes is typically much smaller than
that of the images, this security problem with dynamic database changes can be
alleviated by periodically downloading the indexes from the server to the user side,
decrypting them, and encrypting them again using the new distribution information.
4.4.2 Secure Min-Hash
The min-Hash algorithm, first proposed by Broder et al. [16], provides another
efficient way to compute the Jaccard similarity between the visual words represen-
tations of two images. The min-Hash algorithm was originally developed for near
duplicate detection of text documents [15]; extensions to near duplicate detection
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of images have been proposed recently by applying min-Hash to visual words repre-
sentations [20,21]. Here, we focus on the security aspect of the min-Hash algorithm
and use it for secure ranking of image similarity.
The basic idea of the min-Hash algorithm is as follows: For any given set
A such as the visual words representation, its min-Hash is defined as m(A, f) =
arg minx∈A f(x), where f is a randomized hash function
1 with the property that
Pr[f(x) < f(y)] = Pr[f(x) > f(y)] = 0.5, ∀x, y ∈ A and x 6= y. The probability
that two sets have the same min-Hash value is given by their Jaccard similarity
defined in Equation (4.11).
To compare the similarity between a given query image and an image in the
database, we use their visual words representations:












where Qi and Di are the number of times the i
th visual word appears in the query
and the database image, respectively. Non-zero components in QMH and DMH
suggest the existence of the corresponding visual word and represents the number of
occurrence scaled by the inverse document frequency. In order to apply min-Hash
to measure the Jaccard similarity between the sets QMH and DMH , we follow the
1The hash function used here is different from a cryptographically secure hash function in that
it does not need to be strongly collision free.
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method of Chum et al. [21] and represent QMH and DMH as the following sets:




2 , · · · , X
Q̂2
2 , · · · , X1N , · · · , X
Q̂N
N }, (4.14)




2 , · · · , X
D̂2
2 , · · · , X1N , · · · , X
D̂N
N }. (4.15)
Here, Xji is a unique element indexed by i and j. The min-Hash values generated
from A(QMH) and A(DMH) are essentially elements randomly selected from the two
sets, and they satisfy






In order to obtain a reliable estimate of Sim(QMH , DMH), k independent hash
functions f1, f2, · · · , fk are used to generate k min-Hash values for A(QMH) and
A(DMH), respectively. The concatenation of the k min-Hash values for A(QMH)
forms a sketch of the image QMH , and a sketch of the image DMH is formed simi-
larly. The number of identical values in their sketches, denoted by s(QMH , DMH) =
|{i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k|mi(QMH) = mi(DMH)}|, follows a binomial distribution






l[1− Sim(QMH , DMH)]k−l.
Thus, the maximum likelihood estimate for the similarity of two images Sim(QMH , DMH)
is the fraction of identical values in their sketches, s(QMH , DMH)/k.
To implement the randomized hash function, we use the input value as part
of the seed to a pseudo random number generator and map the input value to a





i ∈ A. In our implementation, X
j0
i0
is the output of a trapdoor
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function g(i0, j0) uniquely determined by i0 and j0 so that it is easy to compute in
one direction to obtain g(i0, j0) given i0 and j0, but it is computationally difficult
to compute in the opposite direction, i.e., to determine i0 and j0 given g(i0, j0).
Therefore, the original word frequency information, as captured by the parameter
j0, can be protected from the adversary who has knowledge of only the min-hash
values. The addition of trapdoor function is different from the normal min-hash and
ensures that the original feature information is securely protected. The trapdoor
function can be implemented through a trapdoor permutation function [51].
During index generation, the content owner creates min-Hash sketch for every
image using a secret key and stores these sketches on the remote server. During
retrieval, the query image is processed similarly by the content owner, who has
the secret key to generate its min-Hash sketch. This sketch is then sent to the
server for comparison with the sketches of the database images. Similarity between
two images is computed as the percentage of identical values in their min-Hash
sketches. Retrieval efficiency can be further improved by organizing similar sketches
into the same bucket of another hash table [100] and comparing only to sketches
with similarity higher than a certain threshold.
4.5 Experimental Results
Two desirable properties of a secure image retrieval scheme are good retrieval
performance that is comparable to state-of-the-art plaintext retrieval schemes and
provable security so that content privacy is protected against adversaries. In this
130
section, we demonstrate the retrieval performance of the proposed secure search
schemes, and in the next section, we analyze the security of these schemes under
different attack models.
4.5.1 Experiment Setup
We perform search and retrieval experiments on an image database containing
1000 color images from the Corel dataset [1]. These images are grouped by content
into 10 categories, with 100 images in each category: African, Beach, Architecture,
Buses, Dinosaurs, Elephants, Flowers, Horses, Mountain, and Food. Image sizes
are either 256 × 384 or 384 × 256. This database has been used as ground-truth
for evaluating color image retrieval [46] and image annotation [18]. Sample images
from the database are shown in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Selected content of the Corel dataset (Figure from [46])
We use global color histogram for the feature randomization based schemes
and localized color histogram for the index randomization based schemes. The
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color histograms are in the HSV color space. For localized color histogram, we
divide an image into 256 blocks and extract a 128-dimensional color histogram from
each block by quantizing the three channels of hue, saturation, and intensity value
into 8, 4, and 4 levels, respectively, where finer quantization is allocated to hue as
suggested by Jeong et al. [46]. For feature randomization based schemes, we have
one histogram for each image, while for index randomization based schemes, we
obtain a training set of 256,000 histograms from the entire database and perform
hierarchical clustering to build the vocabulary tree. During clustering, we use L1
norm to measure the distance between color histograms and take the average of each
cluster as its representative feature. Each node in the vocabulary tree except the
leaf nodes has 10 children and the tree has height 3, which gives 103 visual words.
During search and retrieval, images in the database are returned in the de-
scending order of their similarity to the query. Retrieval performance is evaluated
using precision-recall curves, where precision and recall are defined as
precision =
# of positive images among returned images
# of returned images
,
recall =
# of positive images among returned images
# of positive images in the database
.
A higher precision value at a given recall value indicates better retrieval performance.
Our experiments use every image in the database as a query, and positive images
are those images in the same category as the query.
For comparison with prior art on color histogram based image retrieval, we
choose Jeong et al.’s work [46], where different settings for image retrieval using
color histograms are compared and the best retrieval performance is achieved by
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comparing image similarity using the intersection of global color histograms in the
HSV space. Given two color histograms H1 and H2 in the d-dimensional space, their










Images with higher intersection values are considered more similar. During retrieval,
the color histogram of the query image is compared with every histogram in the
database and images with higher similarity are returned. When the L1 norms of the
histograms are the same, retrieval based on histogram intersection is equivalent to
retrieval by L1 distance of the histograms.
4.5.2 Retrieval Results based on Randomized Features
In contrast to the conventional retrieval scheme that uses plaintext color his-
tograms as features for similarity comparison, we use the randomized versions of
the same features in the secure retrieval scheme. Recall that the distance defined in
Section 4.3.1 between features after bit-plane randomization is an upper bound on
the original L1 distance between features, while random projection and randomized
unary encoding preserves the original L1 distance with high probability. Thus, we
would expect our secure retrieval schemes based on randomized features to have
performance comparable to conventional schemes. The retrieval performance of the
three feature protection schemes are illustrated in Fig. 4.8.
For comparison, we show the retrieval performance using histogram intersec-
tion and L2 distance between plaintext histograms as the top and bottom curves
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Figure 4.8: Retrieval performance based on randomized features
in Fig. 4.8, respectively. For each of the precision-recall curves in Fig. 4.8, a higher
precision value at a given recall value indicates better retrieval performance. We see
that the retrieval performance based on randomized features is better than plaintext
histogram based on L2 norm and is close to plaintext histogram intersection. This
is expected because the original L1 distance between color histograms is approxi-
mately preserved. By searching over randomized features, we only need to retrieve
about 1% − 9% more images to obtain the same number of relevant images as in
plaintext search. This shows that secure retrieval can be achieved by slightly trading
off retrieval accuracy.
Among the three feature protection schemes, we observe a trade-off among
retrieval performance, storage, and computational complexity. Bit-plane random-
ization has the largest gap to the plaintext intersection method among the three
schemes. This is because the distance between features after bit-plane randomiza-
tion is an upper bound to the original L1 distance and there is some discrepancy
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between the distances for certain cases, as discussed in Section 4.3. However, bit-
plane randomization has the lowest complexity O(kn) as compared to O(mn) of
random projection and O(mnM) of randomized unary encoding, where k is the
number of bit-planes to randomize, m is the dimension of the projected features,
and M is the largest value of the feature vector. Random projection and randomized
unary encoding preserve L1 norm with high probability, so their performance can be
made arbitrarily close to plaintext scheme by increasing the projection dimension
m. By doubling the projection dimension m from 128 to 256, the gap between the
curves of plaintext and randomized unary encoding can be reduced by half, and the
performance of random projection can be made almost the same as plaintext search
(random projection with m = 256 is not shown in the figure). With the same m,
random projection outperforms the randomized unary encoding because the latter
projects the much longer unary encoded version than the original feature. M in
randomized unary encoding can be quantized to a much smaller value to reduce
complexity. In this work, we quantize M from 98304 to 128 with no loss in retrieval
performance. The higher complexity of randomized unary encoding is a trade-off
for better security, which will be analyzed in Chapter 5. Compared to traditional
non-secure retrieval scheme, the additional step in our schemes is to randomize the
features using pseudo random permutations or random projection, which are com-
putationally efficient and take less than 1 second per image on a dual-core 3.0GHz
PC with 4GB RAM in our experiments.
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4.5.3 Retrieval Results based on Secure Indexes
The two secure indexing schemes are based on the visual words representa-
tion of the image. To establish the baseline retrieval performance of the visual
words representation, we first demonstrate retrieval using the inverted index with-
out any randomization and compare that with the performance of plaintext his-
togram intersection. In visual words representation, local color histograms are ex-
tracted from blocks of the image. By utilizing the vocabulary tree, each image is
then represented as a bag of visual words Q = {Q̂1, · · · , Q̂N}. Here, Q̂i takes the





, as shown in equations (4.12) and (4.13), where Qi is the





is the inverse document frequency weighting.
In Fig. 4.9, we can see that plaintext histogram intersection and inverted index
with term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) weighting achieve very
similar performance.

















visual words scaled TF−IDF
visual words TF−IDF
traditional histogram intersection
Figure 4.9: Baseline retrieval performance of visual words representation
Considering that w occurrences of a word may not necessarily carry w times the
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significance of a single occurrence, we apply the following scaled TF-IDF weighting,
Q̂i =

(1 + log(Qi)) log(M/Ni), if Qi 6= 0,
0, if Qi = 0,
(4.17)
and find that the inverted index using visual words representation outperforms the
histogram intersection by about 3% in precision. The comparison in Figure 4.9
shows that visual words representation can be used for rank-ordered retrieval of
color images, while its success for object recognition using SIFT [61] features has
been reported in [77,83].
In the secure indexing scheme based on inverted index, the inverted indexes are
randomized by order preserving encryption and random permutation of word IDs.
We perform the same retrieval experiment using randomized inverted indexes and
compare in Figure 4.10 its precision-recall curve with that of the baseline inverted
index without any randomization. We can see that randomization of the index has
very little impact on the retrieval performance, and the precision-recall curves before
OPE and after OPE are very close to each other. This can be attributed to the use
of Jaccard similarity, which is approximately preserved after the order preserving
encryption. Compared to the conventional non-secure setting, generating random-
ized indexes imposes additional computational cost on the content owner, but this
cost is small. When performed on a dual-core 3.0GHz PC with 4GB RAM, the
tasks of extracting features, creating visual words representation, and randomizing
inverted indexes can be done within 2 seconds per image, and search and retrieval
over the entire database of 1000 images takes less than 1 second. The use of inverted
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index ensures that retrieval can be efficiently scaled to larger databases.

















before OPE, scaled TF−IDF
after OPE, scaled TF−IDF
traditional histogram intersection
Figure 4.10: Retrieval performance of
OPE





















Figure 4.11: Retrieval performance of
min-Hash
In the secure indexing scheme based on the min-Hash algorithm, each image is
represented by a sketch {m1,m2, · · · ,mk}, wheremi is the min-Hash value generated
by the ith randomized hash function. Images are returned in the descending order of
their similarity to the query, measured by the percentage of identical values between
their min-Hash sketches. Retrieval performance using min-Hash sketches is shown
in Figure 4.11, where we can see that using min-Hash sketches gives a retrieval
performance comparable to those of the histogram intersection method and the
inverted index scheme. This is expected because the number of identical values in
two min-Hash sketches preserves the Jaccard similarity with high probability. As
the length of the sketch k increases, the estimate for image similarity based on the
percentage of identical values in two min-Hash sketches becomes more accurate,
leading to better precision-recall curves. A sketch length of 1024 gives performances
similar to that of the inverted index scheme. Min-Hash sketches can be computed
138
very efficiently on the user side, taking less than 1 second per image on a Dual-
Core 3.0GHz PC with 4GB RAM. During retrieval, we compare sketches of all the
images in the database in order to obtain the precision-recall curve. In practice,
typically only the most similar images are of interest, so additional hash tables can
be constructed for those sketches to further improve retrieval efficiency.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we studied the problem of confidentiality-preserving content-
based search of images. The application that we are considering is secure online
services that help manage personal multimedia collections. Such applications typi-
cally do not have very high security requirement but demands good efficiency and
least user involvement. We address the problem from a joint signal processing and
cryptography point of view and explore possible efficient solutions. We proposed
two complementary approaches: one is to scramble visual features of multimedia
documents and allow similarity comparison of the randomized features; and the
other is to randomize state-of-the-art search indexes without affecting their search
capability. Scalability and efficiency of the search indexes are retained after the
randomization. We have shown through experiments that retrieval performance
comparable to plaintext retrieval can be achieved. In the next chapter, we will pro-
vide an in-depth study on the security-efficiency trade-off achieved by the proposed




A Comparative Study for Confidentiality-Preserving
Multimedia Search Techniques
The techniques that we proposed in the previous chapter is from a joint signal
processing and cryptography point of view. We have demonstrated the great effi-
ciency of such techniques and in this chapter, we further study the security aspect
of the confidentiality-preserving search problem, and provide a comparative study
of our proposed technique with primarily cryptography techniques in terms of the
security-efficiency trade-off offered by them. Since there is no existing work in the
secure computation literature addressing the problem of confidentiality-preserving
multimedia search, we will first discuss how existing additive homomorphic encryp-
tion and the recent advancement in fully homomorphic encryption can be potentially
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used for multimedia search. We compare these two types of techniques in terms of
their search accuracy on an actual encrypted image database, as well as their secu-
rity strength and computational efficiency. We hope such a quantitative comparison
between these two types of techniques for the problem of secure search can reveal
some insights in practical design of secure computation techniques for real-world
applications involving digital multimedia.
5.1 Review of Cryptographic Techniques
Semantically secure homomorphic public-key encryption schemes are central
cryptographic tool for many secure multi-party computation problem. Below, we
briefly review the basics of simple additive homomorphic encryption and recent
advance of fully homomorphic cryptosystems, then discuss how such techniques can
be applied for the problem of secure multimedia search.
Additive Homomorphic Encryption In an additive homomorphic cryptosys-
tem, given encryptions [a] and [b], the encryption of their summation [a + b] can
be computed by [a + b] = [a][b], where all the computations are performed in the
encrypted domain, without decryption. Following the above property, the multi-
plication of an encrypted value [a] with a known constant b in the clear can be
computed as [ab] = [a]b.
One of the representative additive homomorphic cryptosystem is proposed by
Paillier [80], which is based on the decisional composite residuosity problem. Let
n = pq of size k, where p and q are large prime numbers and k is from the range
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1000 − 2048. Randomly select a base g (g = n + 1 will do). Then to encrypt a
plaintext message m ∈ Zn, the user will select a random value r ∈ Zn and computes
the ciphertext c = gmrn mod n2. The parameters (n, g) are the public keys and the
pair (p, q) serves as the private key. Given a ciphertext c, its plaintext message m
can be obtained by m = L(c
λ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2)
mod n2, where L(u) = u−1
n
. It is easy to see that
the Paillier is additively homomorphic and for an encryption [m], re-randomizing it
can be done without knowing the private key by [m]rn mod n2. More details of the
Paillier cryptosystem can be found in [80].
Fully Homomorphic Encryption Earlier homomorphic cryptosystems [22, 37,
40, 80] support either addition or multiplication between encrypted values, but not
both operations at the same time. This brings challenges to many secure computa-
tion problems because many operations such as computing the Euclidean distance
between two encrypted vectors require both addition and multiplication. With only
additive or multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystem, a cryptography protocol that
involves communication between the two computing parties is typically required.
More recently, in a breakthrough work, Gentry [38] constructed a fully ho-
momorphic encryption (FHE) scheme capable of evaluating an arbitrary number of
additions and multiplications (thus compute any function) on encrypted data. The
mathematics and construction details in [38] are quite involved, but the basic idea
can be summarized as follows. An initial “somewhat homomorphic” scheme based
on ideal lattice is constructed to allow evaluation of essentially unlimited addition
and a certain amount of multiplication. This initial scheme is somewhat homomor-
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phic because the errors in the ciphertext grows with more operations, as such only a
limited amount of multiplication can be supported. To achieve fully homomorphic
encryption, the ciphertext has to be re-encrypted through a technique called ”boot-
strapping”, so that errors in the ciphertext can be cleaned and unlimited number of
operations can be allowed.
Following this first construction of fully homomorphic encryption, there have
been subsequent developments that try to improve the efficiency of FHE [12,13,101,
103,108]. Although the most recent solutions of FHE have improved upon the initial
construction of Gentry, with more efficient encryption and shorter ciphertexts, there
is still a long way to go before FHE can be practical for real-world applications. As
such, Lauter et al. [57] discussed the possibility of using a somewhat homomorphic
encryption, which is more efficient than their FHE counterparts, for applications
that require only a limited amount of multiplication.
Using Homomorphic Encryption for Multimedia Search As discussed in
Section 4.2, the application of rank-ordered image search has different settings from
many secure computation work such as privacy-preserving face recognition [28, 92].
The challenge here is that the database has access only to the encrypted images
and encrypted features, and rank-ordered search results rather than a binary exact
matching is required. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work that
address the problem of rank-ordered multimedia search using homomorphic encryp-
tion. Below, we discuss possible scenarios and constructions of using homomorphic
encryption for secure multimedia search.
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We first provide some notations. We assume that there are N images in
the database, and each image has a visual feature fi ∈ Rn. The query image is
denoted as Q and its visual feature is q ∈ Rn. Paillier homomorphic encryption
of a plaintext message m is denoted as [m], and fully homomorphic encryption is
denoted as [[m]]. The encryption of a feature vector is just the encryption of its
individual components, i.e., [f ] = {[f1], [f2], · · · , [fn]}.
(1) Scenario-1: Additive homomorphic with encrypted query: In this base-
line scenario, we use additive homomorphic encryption to encrypt the visual features
of both the database images and the query image. Since the database will return
a list of encrypted images similar to the query image, encrypting the feature of the
query image is important to prevent the server from inferring the content of returned
images using the query feature.
The computational task in this scenario is to compute distance between en-
crypted vectors [f ] and [q]. Take the commonly used L2 distance as example, we
need to compute
∑n
i=1(fi− qi)2 using only encrypted values [fi], [qi]. Unfortunately,
with additive homomorphic encryption alone, such computation is impossible with-
out decryption because the computation involves both addition and multiplication.
Since the database holds only the encrypted features without knowing the secret
key, in order to proceed with the computation, the database needs to send back
all the encrypted features [fi], i ∈ {1, · · · , N} to the user. The user then decrypts
all the features and compute distances on his/her end. The ranking result on the
computed distances will be sent back to the database to retrieve similar images.
Although the visual features typically have smaller size than the image itself, this
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näıve base-line scenario is still highly impractical because each query will require
the database sending back the entire database of encrypted features. To be more
efficient, the user might as well stores all the visual features on his/her local ma-
chine and computes similarity by his/herself. This alternative costs storage space
and computational burden on the user and fails to utilize the computation power of
online services.
(2) Scenario-2: Additive homomorphic with plaintext query: In order to
fully utilize the computational power of the cloud, we need to minimize the com-
putation and involvement on the user side. In this scenario, we make a relaxation
such that the query feature is not encrypted but sent in plaintext to the database.
The computational task in this scenario is to compute distance between an
encrypted feature [f ] and a plaintext feature q. This can be done directly in the
database without communication with the user. We give two examples with dot
product and L2 distance, respectively. Computing dot product between a plaintext
vector and an encrypted vector is directly supported by additive homomorphic. To
see this, the dot product f ·q =
∑n
i=1 fiqi can be computed in the encrypted domain
as [f · q] = Πni=1[fi]qi , where q is the plaintext query feature. For L2 distance,
‖f − q‖2 =
∑n
i=1(fi − qi)2 =
∑




q2i . The encrypted distance value
thus can be computed as [
∑
f 2i ] · (Π[fi]qi)−2 · [
∑
q2i ]. To allow the database compute
the distance without interacting with the user, the user can provide the database
an encrypted value [
∑
f 2i ] for each feature in the database.
TheN encrypted distance values between the query feature and every database
feature will then be sent back to the user for decryption and ranking. The security
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consideration of allowing the query feature in clear is that the database can infer
the content of the query image and the final images returned from the search. To
mitigate such a security concern, the user can add some noise to the ranking result,
so that not all requested images will be similar to the query. Adding noise increases
security at the cost of less accurate search.
(3) Scenario-3: Fully homomorphic with encrypted query: In this last
scenario, we consider that FHE is used to encrypt features from both the query and
database images. Despite that there is no efficient FHE implementations available,
this scenario still helps us understand how FHE, if efficiently available in the future,
can help address the problem of confidentiality-preserving multimedia search.
With both query and database features encrypted by FHE, the computation
of any distance function between [[f ]] and [[g]] can be done directly in the encrypted
domain without interaction with the user. However, the ranking of the encrypted
distance values cannot be done alone by the database. This is because a semanti-
cally secure FHE should prevent the database from learning any information from
the ciphertext, therefore, the database cannot learn ranking information from the
encrypted distances without interacting with user. To obtain the final ranking, the
database can either send N encrypted distance values to the user or send N(N−1)/2
encrypted binary values indicating the pair-wise relation of encrypted distances. The
user then computes the ranking and requests similar images from the database. We
can see that even FHE cannot completely eliminate the interaction with the user in
order to complete the task of content-based image search.
146
5.2 Comparison on Search Accuracy
We first compare the homomorphic based technique with our proposed ran-
domization techniques in terms their search accuracy. The experimental setup is
the same as in Section 4.5. For conventional content-based image search with-
out any protection, color histograms can be compared using L1 distance. In the
confidentiality-preserving search, the color histogram is either encrypted using ho-
momorphic encryption or scrambled using feature/index randomization techniques.
Homomorphic encryption operates on integer values. This implies that if the
feature vector is in floating point, it has to be properly scaled and quantized. This
will bring quantization error to the distance computation, although such error can
be made quite small and with little impact on the search performance. The color
histogram used in this experiment contain only integer values, so homomorphic en-
cryption can be applied without causing quantization error and the distance between
encrypted features will be exactly the same as that of their plaintext versions. There-
fore, we expect confidentiality-preserving search using homomorphic encryption to
have the same performance as the conventional search.
Feature/index randomization technique scrambles the visual features or search
indexes, and approximately preserves the distance between original features. The
approximate distance preserving property ensures that the search accuracy is pre-
served with only slight degradation. In Fig. 5.1, we compare the search accuracy
of different confidentiality-preserving techniques. Overall, we can see that different
techniques achieve search accuracies that are close to each other. Since feature ran-
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domization operates on global color histogram while index randomization utilizes
the indexes generated from local color histograms, we discuss them separately. For
search indexes, both the homomorphic encryption and secure inverted index retain
the accuracy of using plaintext indexes, therefore, we only show the curve of secure
inverted index for clarity. The secure min-hash technique has a slight performance
drop at hash length 256, but its performance can be made close to the plaintext
index by increasing the hash length. It should be noted that the distance metric
used in these two schemes are Jaccard similarity and number of identical elements,
respectively. Computing such distance metrics between vectors encrypted by homo-
morphic encryption is involved and requires heavy communication with the user.





















Randomized unary encoding (256−dim)
Bit−plane randomization
Figure 5.1: Comparison of search accuracy of different techniques
The other four curves capture the search accuracy of using global color his-
togram protected by homomorphic encryption, bit-plane randomization, random
projection, and randomized unary encoding, respectively. The search accuracy us-
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ing homomorphic encryption technique is the same as the search accuracy using
plaintext features, and is the best among the four. We can see from this figure that
random projection and randomized unary encoding preserve the search accuracy
with only a slight degradation. Furthermore, the search accuracy of using random
projection and randomized unary encoding can also be made arbitrarily close to
the performance of plaintext search by increasing the feature dimension. Among
the three feature randomization techniques, bit-plane randomization has relatively
larger degradation on the search accuracy because the distance between randomized
features is only an upper bound on the original L1 distance.
The comparison above demonstrates that homomorphic encryption can re-
tain the exact search accuracy of a conventional scheme that operates on plaintext
features, while the index and feature randomization techniques also achieve perfor-
mance very close to that of the homomorphic encryption. The gap between the two
can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the feature dimension for techniques
such as random projection, randomized unary encoding, and secure min-hash. It
should be noted that homomorphic encryption will greatly expand the encrypted
feature size, which we will discuss later in this chapter, so at the same protected fea-
ture size, the performance between the homomorphic encryption and feature/index
randomization techniques should be negligible.
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5.3 Comparison on Security-Efficiency Trade-off
In this section, we discuss the security concerns for the application of confi-
dentiality preserving search of multimedia, demonstrate quantitative results on the
protection level achieved by the different techniques, and then specifically discuss
the challenges in employing techniques such as homomorphic encryption and cryp-
tography protocols in terms of their computational and communication complexity.
5.3.1 Security Objective for Rank-Ordered Multimedia Search
In the confidentiality preserving multimedia search scenario considered in this
dissertation, the server stores only the encrypted images and randomized features,
and performs retrieval based on randomized query features. We model the server
as a semi-honest adversary, i.e., it follows the execution requirement of the protocol
but may use what it sees during the execution to infer additional information. Such
a semi-honest model is applicable to such scenarios as web service providers, who
would like to learn as much as possible about the users for their own benefits, such
as better targeted ads, but would not deliberately break the users’ privacy. The
user who uses these third-party services wants to utilize the service’s computational
power for reliable storage, easy access, and better organization of his/her private
data set, but wants to reveal as little information as possible to the server beyond
what is necessary for the server to provide the necessary services.
Given that the database images are already encrypted using highly secure ci-
phers, the security objective here will be to minimize information revealed from the
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randomized features and from the search process. Content-based multimedia re-
trieval relies on comparison of different types of visual features to capture visual or
semantic similarity between images. Visual features can reveal important informa-
tion about image content and therefore storing raw features without any protection
or randomization is never wise. First of all, raw features have fixed structure, from
which an adversary can infer certain aspects of image content. For example, each
bin in a color histogram reveals proportion of that color in the image. A large pro-
portion of blue color might indicate sky or sea, while a large proportion of green
color can suggest trees or grasses. Second, storing raw features allows an adver-
sary to compare them with features of other known images. For example, a close
match of salient features such as SIFT can give an adversary high confidence that
an encrypted image may contain certain objects such as buildings and landmarks.
Both the homomorphic encryption based technique and feature/index randomiza-
tion techniques will hide the fixed visual feature structure and values, and make
it difficult for an adversary to probe the content of encrypted images using known
images.
The second source of information leakage is from the search process, where the
server will compute distance between the query feature and all the features stored
in the database. The result is a list of images ranked by their similarity to the
query. The information revealed in this process is the similarity among database
images. We will see that such an information leakage is inevitable for the applica-
tion of rank-ordered search. The first major reason is that the server provides the
search functionality and needs to return the similar images. Therefore, the server
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will know that the returned images are similar to each other. This is different from
some secure multi-party computation problem such as binary matching of biomet-
rics or text keywords where only a binary answer is returned and the server can be
made oblivious of the matching result. We will show in the following subsections
that the utility requirement of returning similar images has some inherent security
implications that need to be taken into account when designing secure solutions.
The second reason is efficiency. Allowing the server to compare distance between
randomized features is necessary to achieve a practical scheme that avoids multiple
rounds of communication between the server and the user, as is typically required in
secure multi-party computation. This is particularly important for search over large
multimedia databases beyond a few hundred or thousand entries, because for each
query, the communication bandwidth involved in sending intermediate encrypted
values, such as homomorphicly encrypted distance values, back to the user for dis-
tance comparison is formidably expensive.
For homomorphic encryption based technique, the server can infer image sim-
ilarity by observing the search results. For feature/index randomization techniques,
the server can directly compute feature distances to infer the similarity information
about the encrypted images, and learn the distance distribution between the raw fea-
tures, because the randomization techniques are approximately distance-preserving.
For text documents, the relative frequency of letters or words may reveal its plain-
text counterpart, but multimedia content and their signal representations are far
more diverse than letters and words. In the following subsections, we design several
experiments to study the security implication of revealing distance distribution and
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demonstrate that the distribution of distances among visual features encodes only
a limited amount of information and cannot be easily used to infer the plaintext
multimedia content by an adversary.
5.3.2 Protection on Individual Features
As we mentioned earlier, the raw visual features have fixed structure, so that
each element in a feature vector has physical meanings that may reveal image con-
tent information. Simple permutation of the feature vector is not sufficient because
feature values typically have smoothness and correlation property that can be ex-
ploited. Homomorphic encryption of each feature value essentially converts the
feature vector into a random vector where each component can be considered as an
i.i.d. random variable; Feature/index randomization techniques scramble the feature
structure and increase randomness of the resulting feature values by jointly using
cryptographic primitives and signal processing techniques, while approximately pre-
serving distance between feature vectors.
We use three different metrics to measure the level of protection achieved
by the different encryption and randomization techniques. The three metrics are
autocorrelation function, entropy, and conditional entropy of the feature vectors. We
also generate random feature vectors whose values are drawn from i.i.d. uniform
distribution to simulate the results that we can expect from homomorphic encryption
of the feature vectors.
The first metric is the autocorrelation function of the feature vector, which
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measure how correlated the neighbouring feature elements are. The autocorrelation
function for the raw color histogram, visual words representation, and randomized
features/indexes using different algorithms are shown in Fig. 5.2 and 5.3. We can
see that the original color histogram and visual words representation both have
non-negligible correlation for lags larger than 0, which means there exist correlation
between nearby feature values. For both encrypted and randomized features/indexes
the correlation between neighboring feature values or index dimensions have been
reduced to close to 0, similar to what we can expect from a sequence of i.i.d. random
numbers.
The other two metrics are entropy and conditional entropy of the feature
vectors. Given all the feature vectors generated from the 1000 images in the Corel
image database, we quantize the entire range of feature values into 256 levels. We
then consider the quantized feature value as a random variable and measure its
entropy. A higher entropy indicates the feature value has a distribution closer to
uniform, thus higher randomness. The conditional entropy H(X2|X1) measures
randomness of a feature value given its immediate neighbor. The conditional entropy
can be approximated by H(X2|X1) = −
∑
ij µiPij logPij, where µi is the ensemble
distribution of the feature values and Pij is the transition probability.
The entropy and conditional entropy for randomized features/indexes from
different algorithms are shown in Table 5.1. The results are averaged over 50 runs
of randomized features generated by different secret keys. We can see that both
the raw color histogram and visual words representation have relatively low entropy
and conditional entropy, which implies that raw features and indexes have limited
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Figure 5.2: Autocorrelation function on randomized features

























Figure 5.3: Autocorrelation function on randomized indexes
randomness and demonstrate inherent smoothness and correlation among feature
values. The features encrypted by homomorphic encryption can be expected to have
i.i.d. uniform distribution, so their randomness is measured using uniform random
vectors, which achieves the highest entropy and entropy rate. The feature/index
randomization techniques also generate protected features with high entropy similar
to that of pure random vectors. Since we used 256 levels to quantize the feature
values, the maximum possible entropy is 8 bits for a uniform random variable,
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and lower for a Gaussian random variable. The features from random projection
and randomized unary encoding follow Gaussian distribution, and we can see their
randomness is close to what can be achieved by a Gaussian random vector; while
all the other randomized features/indexes follow uniform distribution, and their
entropy are all close to 8 bits.
Table 5.1: Entropy and conditional entropy for randomized features/indexes
Feature type H(X) H(X1|X2)
Color histogram 1.95 1.71
Bitplane randomization 7.72 5.05
Random projection 7.00 6.80
Random unary encoding 6.90 6.80
Gaussian random vectors 6.89 6.72
Index type H(X) H(X1|X2)
Visual words 2.59 2.50
Min-hash 7.93 5.82
Secure inverted index 7.97 7.26
Uniform random vectors 8.00 7.58
The above experiments indicate that the feature/index randomization tech-
niques can generate features and indexes that have similar randomness to a pure
random vector or features after the homomorphic encryption. The feature structure
is scrambled, and each individual feature values become more independent. The
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physical meaning in the feature vectors are therefore hidden from the adversaries.
5.3.3 Protection on The Search Process
During the search process, the server will compute distance between random-
ized features and return a list of encrypted images ranked by their similarity to the
query. Therefore, the server will know that the returned images are likely to be sim-
ilar, and for feature/index randomization techniques, the server will also know the
distance distribution among the randomized features. In this subsection, we carry
out several experiments to see if revealing such information will be of significant
security concern for feature/index randomization techniques.
Clustering on randomized features For homomorphic encryption schemes, the
distance between feature vectors are encrypted and thus not directly obtainable by
the server. From server’s perspective, the encrypted features are the same as a set
of i.i.d. uniform random vectors. For feature/index randomization techniques, since
the server can compute distance between randomized features, it will be able to
perform a clustering of all the features in the database and group encrypted images
into clusters where each cluster contains images that are likely to be similar to each
other. In the Corel image database that we used here, there are 10 categories each
with 100 images. A perfect clustering will generate 10 categories each with the exact
100 images from that category. The better clustering that the server can get using
the distances among features, the more information about the database is revealed
from the feature distance information.
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We carry out K-means clustering on the randomized features/indexes as well
as the i.i.d. uniform random vectors that we expect from homomorphic encryption.
We assume that the server knows the number of clusters in the database as a prior
knowledge. To measure the randomness of the clustering result, we use two metrics.
The first one is the average entropy of image categories over the 10 clusters. We
consider the image category as a random variable, taking values from 1 to 10. After
clustering, each cluster will contain a list of images each with a category number.
The entropy of image category can be computed for each cluster and averaged to
get a value of average cluster entropy. A perfect clustering will generate an average
cluster entropy of 0, and higher entropy indicate that the clustering is more random
and more different from the ground-truth. The second metric is the number of
unique image categories among the 10 clusters. For each cluster, we consider the
dominant image category as the cluster category, then we count how many unique
cluster categories are there. A perfect clustering will generate 10 unique categories.
The clustering results averaged over 50 runs of K-means clustering with different
initial random centroids are shown in Table 5.2.
From the result, we can learn several things. First, clustering on the random
feature vectors or vectors from homomorphic encryption achieve the highest entropy
and fewest unique cluster categories, indicating the clustering result is most differ-
ent from the ground-truth. Second, the randomized features and indexes from the
randomization techniques achieve similar randomness to that of the raw color his-
togram. This can be expected from the approximate distance preserving property
of the randomization algorithms. Third and most importantly, even the clustering
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Table 5.2: K-mean clustering results
Feature type Average cluster entropy # of unique cluster categories
Color histogram 1.61 8.72
Random projection 1.50 8.40
Randomized Unary encoding 1.56 8.52
Bitplane randomization 2.49 7.74
Secure Min-hash 1.92 7.96
Secure inverted index 2.16 7.56
Random feature vectors 3.26 7.06
results on raw color histogram are quite different from the ground-truth. We can
expect each cluster to contain images from 3 to 6 different categories. This can
be mainly attributed to the semantic gap in image search, where low level visual
features cannot capture very well high level semantic concepts. In other words,
there is a gap from knowing the visual features to knowing the semantic concept of
the image, which actually helps add another security layer for multimedia related
applications.
Image categories indistinguishability From the previous experiment, we know
that the server will not be able to obtain the exact ground-truth clustering from the
randomized features. In this subsection, we perform experiments to demonstrate
that even if the server can obtain the ground-truth clustering, these clusters of
randomized or encrypted features will be highly indistinguishable from the server’s
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point of view.
We assume that the server has the prior knowledge of the category names
in the database, but does not know which name corresponds to each of the 10
clusters of encrypted images. In the Corel image database used in this chapter,
the 10 categories are “African”, “Beach”, “Architecture”, “Buses”, “Dinosaurs”,
“Elephants”, “Flowers”, “Horses”, “Mountain”, and “Food”. The first experiment
we carry out here is to see that given a plaintext image from one of the 10 categories,
whether the server can successfully associate it with the correct cluster of encrypted
images. Since the server does not know the secret key used in randomization, we will
randomize the feature of the known plaintext image using a randomly chosen key and
use the randomized feature as query to compare with features in the database. The
retrieval performance of using every image in the database as query but randomize
its feature using a randomly chosen key is shown in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5.
Figure 5.4: Retrieval using a wrong key
for feature protection schemes

















Inverted index, correct key
Min−hash, correct key
Inverted index, wrong key
Min−hash, wrong key
Figure 5.5: Retrieval using a wrong key
for secure index schemes
Since the database has 100 images in each of the 10 categories, a random
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selection from the database would imply a precision value around 0.1 for all recall
values. From this figure, we can see that the retrieval precision of feature/index
randomization techniques is reduced to around 0.1 if a different secret key is used
to randomize the feature or index. In other words, a query index randomized by a
different key from the correct one will be equally like to be closest to any randomized
feature in the database. Therefore, without knowing the correct secret key, retrieval
from an encrypted database is equivalent to picking images randomly from the
database. The chance of the server associating a plaintext image of known category
to the correct cluster in the encrypted database is no better than random guessing.
Next, we carry out an experiment to see when the server has multiple plaintext
images from some image category, whether the distribution of visual features among
those images of the same category can be used to differentiate clusters of encrypted
images. For each of the 10 categories in the Corel database, we first divide the
100 images in that category equally into two sets Si1, Si2, i = 1, 2, · · · , 10, each
with 50 images. The distance distributions from {Si1} are used as query to search
for closest match in distance distributions from {Si2}. The purpose of such an
experiment is to see whether the distance distribution of visual features has the
discriminative power to differentiate different image categories. The less distinctive
of distance distributions among image categories, the less information about the
image database is revealed. Kullback-Leibler divergence is used as a distance metric
for the distributions and the probability of correct match over 100 runs with different
secret keys is shown in Table 5.3.
From the table, we can see that for the 10 categories in the Corel database, the
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Table 5.3: Search accuracy using distance distribution of different categories
Feature type Prob. of match Feature type Prob. of match
Color histogram 40% Visual words 40%
Bitplane randomization 29.7% Secure inverted index 24.8%
Random projection 25.4% Secure Min-hash 16.6%
Unary encoding 9.8% Random feature vectors 9.7%
probability of correctly matching two distance distributions from the same category
is 40% for both the raw color histogram and visual words representation. This
relatively low match accuracy, as compared to the search accuracy using visual
features, implies that distance distribution between the visual features is not a
very good discriminative feature to differentiate different image categories. After
randomization, the match accuracy on the randomized features and indexes are
further reduced. Especially for randomized unary encoding, the match accuracy is
close to 10%, which is essentially like random guessing and similar to what can be
achieved by i.i.d. random vectors. Another thing to notice is that we only have 10
categories in the image database. For a larger image database with more categories,
we can expect the match accuracy to further decrease.
All the experiments in this subsection show that due to the extremely diverse
representation of multimedia data and the semantic gap between the visual features
and semantic concept, it is extremely difficult for an adversary to learn useful in-
formation about the image content from the distance distribution of visual features.
162
Measured by the metrics used in the above experiments, the feature/index random-
ization techniques can achieve security performance close to that of homomorphic
encryption.
5.3.4 Challenges in Employing Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
From the previous comparisons, we have seen that homomorphic encryption
schemes achieve the exactly the same search accuracy as that of using plaintext
features, and offer the highest amount of randomness in terms of confidentiality
protection for the visual features and the search process. The feature/index random-
ization techniques, although not designed as encryption schemes, come very close
to the performance of homomorphic encryption schemes in terms of both search
accuracy and confidentiality protection. In this section, we discuss some practical
challenges and considerations when employing these two types of techniques in the
application of confidentiality preserving rank-ordered multimedia search.
Security benefit of cryptographic approaches The feature/index random-
ization techniques proposed in [62, 64] are designed with efficiency and distance
preserving property in mind, but strictly speaking, they are not encryptions as
those commonly used cryptographic ciphers. Secure cryptographic ciphers require
semantic security, which demands randomized encryption. Due to the distance pre-
serving requirement, the feature/index randomization schemes are deterministic.
Homomorphic encryption, on the other hand, offers randomized encryption of vi-
sual features and prevents the server from computing distance between encrypted
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features directly. In some secure computation problems such as those involve text
documents and biometrics, such a security benefit of randomized encryption and
hiding the computation results would be important. However, for the problem of
rank-ordered image search, the security benefit from homomorphic encryption may
not justify its high computational complexity.
In the previous comparisons, we have shown that distance information from
visual features is not a discriminative feature for differentiating different image cat-
egories. Furthermore, the requirement on the server to return a list of encrypted
images similar to the query brings some inherent security implication that might
diminish the benefits from cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryp-
tion. The main reason is that the utility requirement of returning similar images
inevitably reveals the information that those returned images are similar to each
other. Therefore, even if the encryption for the individual features are semantic se-
cure, some information about the ciphertext will be revealed. This is similar to the
application of statistical database, where the database is required to return global
statistical information about the private data it holds. Such a utility requirement
makes semantic security impossible for statistical database, as proved by Dwork [26].
Instead, differential privacy is used to quantify security from different perspective
for those applications where ciphertext carries utility to the adversary and semantic
security is impossible. Typical technique to achieve differential privacy is to add
noise to the returns from the database at the cost of noisy and less useful results.
Exploring differential privacy formulation for the problem of image search can be
an interesting issue for future research, but may be non-trivial or even impossible
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given the unique application settings of the problem. Nevertheless, we can see that
using homomorphic encryption may not bring significant security benefit over fea-
ture/index randomization techniques for the problem of confidentiality-preserving
multimedia search.
Efficiency cost of cryptographic approaches In addition to the limited se-
curity benefit, the huge computational and communication complexity is another
major limitation of homomorphic encryption schemes at this moment. First of
all, using encryption such as homomorphic encryption is computationally intensive
and causes large amount of ciphertext expansion. Some comparison between the
Paillier homomorphic encryption and the proposed randomization algorithms are
listed in Table 5.4, where the encryption time and ciphertext size of all the 1000
features/indexes in the database are shown. The homomorphic encryption imple-
mentation is based on a C library from http://acsc.cs.utexas.edu/libpaillier/. All
implementations are in C/C++ and run on a Linux desktop with 3.0GHz dual core
CPU and 4GB RAM. The randomized features are stored in binary format and
further compressed using zip. We can see that homomorphic encryption takes far
longer time to encrypt the 1000 color histograms from the Corel database and re-
sults in largest expansion on the feature size, which also implies that homomorphic
encryption will incur high communication cost in order to transfer the encrypted
features to the server. Among the feature/index randomization techniques, ran-
domized unary encoding and secure min-hash have relatively longer running time,
because they have more randomization steps in their algorithms. Since there is no
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efficient fully homomorphic encryption implementations available yet, we do not re-
port its complexity here, which can be expected to be much higher than Paillier at
this moment.
Table 5.4: Efficiency comparison of feature randomization schemes
Encryption time Ciphertext size / expansion factor
Paillier Homomorphic 1778.5s 32005KB / 241.8
Bitplane randomization 0.24s 159KB / 1.2
Random projection 0.38s 462KB / 3.5
Randomized unary encoding 9.64s 457KB / 3.5
Secure inverted index 0.32s 246KB / 2.1
Secure Min-hash 3.04s 296KB / 2.5
The advantages and disadvantages of our proposed randomization techniques
and the homomorphic encryption based techniques are summarized in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Summary of comparison












The advantages of using homomorphic encryption are that it retains the search
accuracy of plaintext features and offers randomized encryption so that the server
cannot obtain distance between encrypted features directly. The disadvantage is
that it is too computation and communication intensive to be practical, requiring
frequent user involvement in order to obtain the ranking results. On the other hand,
feature/index randomization techniques have the advantage of being highly efficient
and requiring minimum user-involvement when computing the search results. The
search accuracy and confidentiality protection offered by feature/index randomiza-
tion are very close to that of homomorphic encryption schemes. The limitation of
feature/index randomization is that they are deterministic methods and thus the
server can learn distance distribution of randomized features. We provided vari-
ous experiments to demonstrate that the revealing distance distribution may not
be a significant security concern for multimedia data and the utility requirement of
rank-ordered search has some inherent security implications that may diminish the
security benefit of using homomorphic encryption.
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we quantitatively compared the security-efficiency trade-off
offered by our proposed techniques and alternative cryptography techniques for the
problem of confidentiality-preserving multimedia search. We first discussed how
existing cryptography primitives such as homomorphic encryption can be adapted
to the rank-ordered search problem. Such adaptation is highly inefficient given the
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current state of the art. Furthermore, the utility requirement of rank-ordered search
limits the amount of security benefits that homomorphic encryption can bring. To
justify that our proposed randomization techniques offer a better security-efficiency
trade-off, we devised several metrics and experiments for a quantitative comparison.
Such a comparative study suggests that a joint signal processing and cryptography
point of view may offer better solutions to online multimedia applications that do




Conclusions and Future Perspectives
In this dissertation, we have explored two major research problems regarding
trustworthiness and confidentiality of online multimedia data. Trustworthiness and
confidentiality are two closely related and increasingly important aspects for the
emerging technologies of mobile and cloud computing. In the first part, we evaluate
trustworthiness of a multimedia document by estimating its processing history using
novel forensic techniques. In the second part, we design algorithms to preserve
confidentiality of online multimedia while offering efficient search capability.
To evaluate multimedia trustworthiness, this dissertation proposes a new mul-
timedia forensic framework called “Forensic Hash for Multimedia Information As-
surance”, or FASHION in short. Under this framework, a compact signature called
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“Forensic hash” that encodes information of the original multimedia is utilized to
provide enhanced forensic analysis for the multimedia document under question.
The forensic capability of FASHION goes beyond a binary answer of whether the
multimedia document can be trusted or not, but provides an in-depth assessment
on the processing history in terms of the types and parameters of the operations
that have been applied on the multimedia data. The FASHION framework bridges
two related research areas of image hashing and no-reference multimedia forensics,
and combines the benefits from both.
The challenge in FASHION is to design compact hash that provides good foren-
sic capability. To avoid the dilemma of one-scheme-fit-all, we suggested a modular
design of the forensic hash for the advantage of flexibility and extensibility. For
such a modular construction, we designed alignment component and integrity com-
ponent, which address different forensic questions but complement each other in
a synergistic way. Alignment component aims at estimating geometric transforms
such as rotation and scaling, and such estimation enables accurate tampering lo-
calization which is the main objective of an integrity component. We proposed
compact constructions for both components and demonstrated their robustness and
accuracy in revealing processing history of digital images.
A good forensic hash design should have good extensibility, i.e., answering
a broad scope of forensic questions by introducing new modules or using existing
modules. This dissertation demonstrates such an extensibility by using forensic hash
to estimate advanced image editing operation such as seam carving. The forensic
hash that we originally designed for estimating geometric transform is shown to be
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very effective in estimating seam carving without changing the hash design, and
therefore can be used to evaluate trustworthiness for images that have undergone
advanced editing and tampering.
In addition to learning the processing history, evaluating quality of a multi-
media document after all the processing operations is another important aspect of
trustworthiness. This dissertation extends the FASHION idea to the task of qual-
ity assessment on images that have undergone retargeting operations. We designed
compact side information to capture the structure distortion caused by the retarget-
ing operation and demonstrated positive correlation between the proposed quality
score and human subjective ratings. Quality assessment focusing on content struc-
ture distortion is not well studied and our work is among the first endeavors in this
direction.
In today’s online services and more broadly the cloud computing paradigm,
confidentiality of data stored online is a critical requirement that needs to be satis-
fied. In this dissertation, we studied the problem of confidentiality-preserving search
for online multimedia. The key challenge in this problem is to achieve content-based
search capability over multimedia data that have been encrypted or properly pro-
tected for privacy concerns, and in the meanwhile, striking a good balance between
security and efficiency for practical applications. In light of the efficiency limita-
tions of purely cryptographic approaches, we address the problem from a practical
perspective and proposed distance preserving randomizations by jointly applying
techniques from image processing, information retrieval, and cryptography. Effi-
ciency and accuracy of the search is demonstrated on a practical image database.
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There are several contributions of this work. To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first endeavor in the community to study the problem of confidentiality-
preserving rank-ordered search of multimedia. This problem has unique challenges
as compared to problems studied in existing secure computation literature. We pro-
vided a quantitative study on the security-efficiency trade-off provided by our pro-
posed randomization techniques and alternative cryptographic approaches. Such
a quantitative study brings interesting insight on the design of confidentiality-
preserving techniques for multimedia data.
The study of trustworthiness and confidentiality issues for online multimedia
data in this dissertation brings up many interesting research questions that are
worth further exploration. Following our current forensic hash constructions, it
will be interesting to provide a theoretical modelling for the FASHION framework,
which models the process of generating the forensic hash and also the process of
forensic analysis using the hash. A sound theoretical modelling can help answer
some fundamental questions, for example, what the optimal design of a forensic hash
is for a particular forensic task, and how the hash length relates to the performance
of forensic analysis. Our work in this dissertation has focused on robustly estimating
particular operations when the multimedia document has undergone multiple other
operations. It would be interesting to explore the possibility of estimating the orders
of operations, i.e., which operation occurred earlier in the processing chain. This
can provide useful information when evaluating trustworthiness of multimedia data.
In addition to the theoretical formulation of FASHION, continued effort should
be made toward designing new hash components for a wider range of operations and
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forensic tasks. For example, forensic hash that identifies different image enhance-
ment operations and Photoshop editing operations would be valuable to tell people
which regions of the image has been artistically enhanced and which regions remain
faithful to its original form; forensic hash for video data will be an important ex-
tension of the technologies that we studied in this dissertation, and we can imagine
compactness and efficiency will be critical aspects in forensic hash design for videos.
The FASHION spirit can go beyond multimedia forensic applications, as we have
already demonstrated in the study of quality assessment on retargeted images. In
addition to revealing structural distortion of retargeting algorithms, it would inter-
esting to see whether we can use the compact side information to reconstruct the
original image from a retaregeted one. Depending on how faithful the reconstruc-
tion is and how compact the side information is, this can potentially offer a different
image compression paradigm.
The search capability that we have studied in this dissertation is an important
functionality for secure online multimedia management. A natural next step is to
explore a broader range of confidentiality-preserving operations on multimedia data.
For example, directly editing multimedia data such as images and videos online with-
out leaking content information can be useful to save users from the computational
burdens of such editing operations. Categorization, summarization, and annotation
for encrypted multimedia collections are some other desirable functionalities that
a secure online multimedia service could provide [63]. As we have demonstrated
in this dissertation, designing confidentiality-preserving techniques for multimedia
data has unique challenges. A better understanding on what would be the proper
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security definition for multimedia applications and more effort on seeking the best
security-efficiency trade-off will be needed in these future explorations.
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